



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



600077727-





THE EASTERN QUESTION.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY E. J. FRANCIS AND CO.
TOOK'S COURT AND WINE OFFICE COURT, E.C.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

BY

SIR CHARLES WENTWORTH DILKE,
BART., M.P.,

AUTHOR OF "GREATER BRITAIN" AND OF "THE FALL OF PRINCE
FLORESTAN OF MONACO,"

AND EDITOR OF "THE PAPERS OF A CRITIC."

8238



LONDON:
ROBERT J. BUSH,
32, CHARING CROSS, S.W.

1878.

246. e. 447.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

On Tuesday Evening, January 15, SIR CHARLES W. DILKE delivered the following Speech at Kensington Vestry Hall, Mr. Robert Freeman in the chair.

THERE can, I think, be little need that I should speak to-night at length of Home Affairs, except at a later hour, in answer to your questions. Those of you who did me the honour to come and hear, or to read, my speech at Chelsea in September last, know what I think of the past measures and administration of the Government. You will hear from the report which I hope to make to you at Hammer-smith, when the session of 1878 has reached its end, what I may think of the Bills which will be presented to us in the present year. We already know what they must be. It needs no gift of prophecy to foretell the presentation to us by the Administration of codifying measures with regard to Factories and Workshops, Bankruptcy, Valuation of Property, Valuation of Property in Ireland, Corrupt Practices and Election Petitions, and Patents for Inventions. I presume that we shall

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

once more see the familiar faces of the Summary Jurisdiction Amendment Bill, the Roads and Bridges (Scotland) Bill, the Board of Education (Scotland) Bill, the Sheriffs' Courts (Scotland) Bill, the Poor Law (Scotland) Bill, and the County Courts (Ireland) Bill. A Commons Enclosure Bill will once more vex our souls. After the distinct breach of faith which occurred last year as to the Maritime Contracts Bill, I hardly know whether to expect one, but we shall doubtless see one of those Bishoprics Bills dear to the heart of Mr. Cross. A Public Health (Metropolis) Bill may once more propose to weaken the responsibilities of those who are charged with the local government of London, without doing much for public health, and it is possible, though far from probable, that a Fire Brigade (Metropolis) Bill may be passed. In spite of the opposition of the bankers, I expect to see the Post-Office Money Order Bill again. There is a nightmare of a Cattle Plague Bill which haunts our sleep—a Bill which will be opposed with might and main. So much for the Government Bills—a ragged regiment! Two larger subjects are, indeed, ready to be dealt with, but it is so hopeless to expect that the present Government would be allowed by the Conservative party in the country to treat them as they should be treated, that I do not wish to see Bills brought in. It is just conceivable that Government may introduce a Burials Bill, and it is even probable that they will print a Local Government and County Boards Bill; but of these two measures we may be sure, before we see them, that their faces

will be so ugly that, having seen them once, we shall wish them hurried from our sight. We may be certain that a Burials Bill of a Conservative Government would not satisfy the just claims of those who are not members of the Established Church, and that a County Boards Bill of a Conservative Administration will not establish a free elective system worthy of the position of this country as the inventor of self-government. We may, I fear, be sure that the country will be no better for the legislation of this year: let us hope that it will be no worse. As regards myself, besides any part that I may take in discussions raised by others, and in addition to action on subjects which I have raised in previous years, I shall, on the earliest day I can obtain, bring forward an Hours of Polling Metropolis Bill, intended to carry out the Report of our Committee of last year upon Hours of Polling, and to make the hours in London eight to eight. I am happy to say that all the four Metropolitan Conservative members representing the boroughs most affected by the present restriction of hours to whom I have applied, my colleague being one, have at once consented to let me place their names upon my Bill. I shall also move for a Select Committee (in this also carrying out the Report of the Government Committee of last year) to enter upon the investigation of the cases of the boroughs outside the metropolis, to consider whether a change in the polling hours should be made for them. Of my Registration of Voters' Bill I will not speak, for we shall all need rather to watch the

measures of Government and the course of foreign affairs than to push Bills of our own.

Speaking upon Foreign Affairs at Chelsea in September last, I said that, as regarded the past, the Government policy had wholly failed, and that, as regarded the future, the war seemed unlikely to end in 1877, and that the present meeting would give us a further chance to discuss the future of the Eastern Question.

A little more than a fortnight ago it was announced that England, that is to say, that Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield, had agreed to approach the Emperor of Russia on behalf of Turkey. The official paragraph was favourably received by the moderate and peace-loving portion of the public, but I confess it filled me with alarm. We were not in a position to act as the Attorney of the Turks, and I fail to see why we should be their Letter-carrier. We have been told over and over again, that we ourselves are directly interested in the settlement to be come to, and interested parties ought not to mediate. If, for various reasons, direct agreement between the belligerents is to be avoided, and if you cannot find a disinterested and impartial mediator, then mediation should be collective, and not a step should be taken singly by a neutral power. I see in isolated mediation a continuance in that long course of isolation which our Government has pursued.

To put before you the case I make against the Government, I must ask you to follow me through a short list of some of their chief acts which I have

made up from the Blue Books. It will, I think, show not only that their policy has failed, but that it has failed with loss of dignity, with present harm and future danger to the country.

In August, 1875, the Government consented, "with reluctance," to take a part in sending a European Consular Mission to inquire into disturbances in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Mission failed because the insurgents would not believe the promises of the Turks made in a Firman of September, and promising great reforms. These promises, I may add, were renewed in October and November; and in December a fresh Firman was issued, which "crowned the edifice" built up by the Firman of 1839 and the Hati-Humayoun of 1856. The promises of 1875 are as much of a dead letter as are those of 1839 and 1856. On the 30th of December, 1875, the Andrassy Note was agreed to between Austria, Russia, and Germany. In the first week in January, 1876, France and Italy adhered to it, and urged England to concur. Our Government refused to do so until asked by Turkey. On the 13th of January Turkey asked England to concur, and on the 25th of January our Government adhered to the Andrassy Note "with hesitation." When they do right it is always "with hesitation," or "with reluctance." In February, 1876, a powerful British fleet was sent to Besika Bay, with the effect, explained by Sir Henry Elliot, that the Turks did not "feel altogether deserted," but with a declaration in England that what was in view was the protection of the

foreigners at Constantinople against the Turks. In the middle of May the Berlin Memorandum was agreed to by five Great Powers—Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, and France. On the 19th of that month England declined to concur, not only to the “regret” and “great regret” of the first four of those Powers, but also, and this I beg you specially to observe, to the “surprise and grief” of France. Our Government had refused to sign the Berlin Memorandum on account of a reference in it to the possible need of taking “efficacious measures” to secure good government in Turkey. But it was England who, not shrinking from mere words, but herself proposing deeds, had taken a really “efficacious” part in the “efficacious measures” of 1860, when, after the massacres in the Lebanon, Europe, the Powers making that engagement not to accept territory which would also have been made in 1876, sent Lord Dufferin to Syria with a French armed force. In 1860 Lord Dufferin, in the name of Europe, hanged a guilty Pacha, and pacified the Lebanon, which to this moment still enjoys, in consequence of European intervention, a better government than the rest of Turkey, and this with the result of an increase of strength to the Turkish power. Only the obstructiveness of our Government prevented the still more easy pacification of the European provinces of Turkey in 1876, and caused the present war, with all its harm to British trade and all its risks to “British Interests.” In May, too, there began the massacres in Bulgaria. On the 15th of that month the Porte declared that

the troubles in Bulgaria were but slight, and did not possess an insurrectionary nature; yet many thousands of men, women and children were slain by Turkish troops under the command of well-known Pachas with every circumstance of horror. In July our Government trifled with the subject; but in August, public feeling having become aroused, Lord Derby sent a strong remonstrance to the Porte. On the 5th September, addressing Sir Henry Elliot, he used even stronger terms, and said, "the outrages.....committed by the Turkish troops".....have stirred up "a universal feeling of indignation in all classes of English society.....In the extreme case of Russia's declaring war against Turkey, Her Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defence of the Ottoman Empire." On the 14th September Government received Mr. Baring's official report on the atrocities committed in Bulgaria in May; and on the 21st Lord Derby addressed to Turkey a despatch in which he demanded, in the name of England, and in the sharpest words ever, I think, used in a despatch, reparation, and the punishment of certain offenders mentioned by name, one of whom was Chefket Pacha. I may add that this man was also named by Lord Derby in his instructions to Lord Salisbury, in the winter, when he directed Lord Salisbury to "convey to the Porte a further and very serious warning with regard to the manner in which the outrages committed on the population in Bulgaria are allowed by the Turkish Government to remain without redress. In the despatch," Lord

Derby went on, "addressed to Sir Henry Elliot on the 21st September, His Excellency was instructed to demand an audience of the Sultan, and to communicate to His Majesty the result of our inquiriesnaming Chefket Pacha.....whose conduct" had been "denounced" by us to the Government of Turkey. Sir Henry Elliot had been directed to require, in the name of England, the "signal, conspicuous, and exemplary punishment" of this man and others, which had not reached them, and to ask for a reparation which had not been made. Punishment and reparation had, however, been "personally promised" by the Sultan himself on the 7th October. Chefket Pacha has, since that time, been promoted to very high command.

In September, 1876, Servia and Montenegro were at war with Turkey, and Russia and Austria proposed to England a naval demonstration by England and France to induce the Turks to grant an Armistice. Lord Derby refused, but he urged the Porte to consent to a Conference, and threatened, if they should refuse both Armistice and Conference, to withdraw our Ambassador—a punishment viewed with equanimity by the Turks. Turkey replied by founding a Constitution, which Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote have declared was no reply at all:—a Constitution which has been already violated several times. In the course, however, of October, England backed out of the Armistice negotiations, and left Russia face to face with Turkey. The result was that on the 30th of that month Russia presented an ultimatum to the

Porte. The immediate effect was the surrender of the Turks, who, on the 1st November, consented to an Armistice. It is not true, you see, that Turkey granted peace to Servia on the request of England, and not true, therefore, that England was morally bound to Turkey to prevent a renewal of the war. The Armistice was refused to Europe, and yielded to a Russian ultimatum. It may be observed that while the friends of Turkey tell us that the Berlin Memorandum would have been useless because Turkey would have resisted Europe, the history of the Armistice negotiations shows that until encouraged by the action of our Government she dared not even resist one Power. That the pressure proposed, not only by the three Empires and by Italy, but by France, was needed, the leading members of the Government have themselves admitted :—the Home Secretary, the Indian Secretary, the Colonial Secretary, the Leader of the House of Commons, have all spoken strongly in that sense. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said :—“ I feel it to be impossible really to secure peace to Europe unless we take steps also to improve the administration of the provinces of Turkey. So long as you leave that sore open, the original cause of these disturbances, any peace you may promote for the moment will be a hollow peace, no better than if a piece of parchment or of sticking-plaister were put on a wound which was festering below.”

To return to my Calendar, on the 2nd November our Ambassador at St. Petersburg received most friendly assurances from the Tsar, which were re-

peated at another interview on the 5th, and on that day telegraphed to and read in England. On the 9th the Premier made a fierce attack on Russia at Guildhall. On the next day the Tsar made a war-like speech against Turkey at Moscow. On the 15th our Ambassador reported that the Guildhall speech had had a bad effect in Russia, and on the 17th the mobilization of the Russian army was decreed. At the same moment a Conference was agreed on by the Powers and the Porte. In December the Conference met, the first regular meeting being preceded by many informal ones, which cost a great deal in telegrams, but did not produce much result. On the 14th December Lord Salisbury proposed that Bulgaria should be occupied by English troops, which was a remarkable departure from the line taken by Lord Derby in refusing to accept the possibility of a need for "efficacious measures." The English occupation being declined by all the powers, on the 18th December Lord Salisbury telegraphed home for leave to agree to the occupation of Bulgaria by a Belgian force. Our Government telegraphed back that the occupation should "appear to be made" at the request of the Porte. Not that it should be so made, but "should appear to be" so made! It was now too late. Turkey had been encouraged by us into mobilization. Russia had been thwarted by us into mobilization. The time was past when we might have averted war, with all its horrors to the combatants, with all its dangers to ourselves, when we might have pacified the East, protected alike the Eastern

Christians and "British Interests" by a signature. An adherence to the European policy given in May, 1876, would have been for the good even of the Turkish power. Turkey would have gained, not lost, by our preserving the European Concert. War would have been averted, as in 1839-40 and in 1860. The war, which might have been prevented by our Government, has raised the price of bread by closing the Black Sea, and has added to the depression of trade. Its results cannot be a gain to "British Interests," and may prove a serious blow to them, for we still may find ourselves left alone in face of terms of peace which may harm no one but ourselves.

On the 22nd December, Lord Derby stated that the English Cabinet had decided not to be a party to the use of coercion if the Porte should decline the "minimum" of the Powers. On the 10th January, 1877, he repeated his views in this direction, and on the 18th the Porte refused even the "minimized" but "irreducible minimum." Thus ends the history of a solemn farce. To the joy of Turkey, the Ambassadors, special and ordinary, all left Constantinople, a different phrase, however, being used by our Government to describe the withdrawal of Sir Henry Elliot to that made use of by the other Powers, and one implying that he might soon return. There is a saying which tells that "Councils of War never fight," but I think that we might read instead, "Councils of Peace always fight," for out of most European Conferences there grows war. On the 22nd January,

our Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported that Russia considered the result of the Conference an insult to Europe, but that Russia would not separate herself from the other Powers. On the 31st, Russia addressed a Circular to the Powers, which, in language both true and dignified, asked what they meant to do. On the 19th February, the Russian Circular not having been yet answered, and the Porte having done nothing towards carrying out the promised reforms, the Russian Ambassador assured Lord Derby that if the Powers continued to refuse all action, Russia would have to act alone. On the 26th the Russian Chancellor said that Russia desired peace, but was prepared for war, and that the decision between peace and war now rested, not with Russia, but with the Powers. Early in March a Draft Protocol, recording the expectations of the Powers with regard to Turkish reforms, was handed to Lord Derby, who promised to sign if Russia would promise to disarm. Between the 21st and 28th of March, negotiations were continued, in the course of which Lord Derby became aware of the exact terms in which Russia would make a declaration of conditional disarmament. In other words, the declarations to be made by England and Russia at the moment of signing the Protocol were settled. As Lord Hartington said in his admirable speech of the 14th of May,—a speech which has never received as much praise as its sense and its eloquence deserved,—“From the very commencement of the negotiations the Government knew under what conditions alone Russia was prepared

to disarm.....They knew that Russia was not willing to accept the mere promises of Turkey. The Government had themselves assented to the justice of that position. Nothing could have been stronger than the assertions of Lord Salisbury and of Lord Derby himself, that the promises of Turkey were not a sufficient guarantee." Yet the Government has since pretended that it "obtained from Russia a stronger word than demobilization, disarmament," upon a mere Turkish promise. On the 31st of March the Protocol was signed. It declared that the Powers "have undertaken in common the pacification of the East." That the objects of the Powers are "the well-being of the Christian population, and the interests of general peace." The whole record of the proceedings of the Conference shows that this is an accurate statement of the facts ; yet Lord Derby, in the singular Declaration on the part of England by which he accompanied his signature, denied the facts themselves, and asserted that his "sole object" was peace. He thus threw over the first of the two "objects of the Powers"—the one out of which the whole European intervention had grown. The Protocol went on emphatically to declare of the Powers that "if their hopes should be once more disappointed, and if the condition of the Christian subjects of the Sultan should not be improved in a manner to prevent the return of the complications which periodically disturb the peace of the East, they think it right to declare that such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their interests."

How could our Government agree to sign this statement, that the treatment of the Bulgarians by Turkey was incompatible with British interests, and yet pretend that in a certain event the value of their signature of this statement would disappear? The declaration is a strong one, and is one of fact—not of opinion; and the value of Lord Derby's signature of it is not destroyed because war has followed. You may say that the Protocol is null, but the assertions of fact cannot be null. I believe that the statements of the Protocol were true. I think that the real "British Interests" are peace and freedom, and that the state of Turkey is at variance with both. We needs must dwell upon the Protocol and the inconsistency with its terms of Lord Derby's later language. On the one hand we have our Government, by the voice of Lord Salisbury, its special delegate to assembled Europe, of Sir Stafford Northcote, of Mr. Cross, of Lord Carnarvon, and, by his signature to the Protocol, of Lord Derby, declaring that reform in Turkey is necessary to British interests and to the peace of Europe; that Turkish promises of reform are worthless, and Turkish reforms unattainable without pressure and guarantees. On the other hand, you find our Government, by the voice of the Premier, and of Lord Derby in a later despatch, to which I will presently allude, throwing all the blame of war on Russia.

I hold by the Protocol which they signed, and think, that which they thought when they signed it, or else their signing was a disgraceful act, that the unreformed state of Turkey is and will continue to be

the greatest standing danger to the peace of Europe. Lord Derby says he signed only to secure peace. He did not secure it. But he gives us to understand that in order to secure it he signed something which would not bear investigation. As though he would have signed anything that was presented to his pen—a cheque for a million on his private banker, or an order for the incarceration of Mr. Gladstone, if he had been told that the result would have been peace. Yet, if he had but sounded Turkey, he might have known that the effect of his double signature—that to the Protocol, and that to his Declaration (that the Protocol was null unless followed by disarmament)—was certain war. He knew the conditions on which Russia had promised to disarm. Had he sounded Turkey he would have known that Turkey would refuse those conditions. Immediately after signing the Protocol and reading his Declaration Lord Derby communicated both to Turkey. About the same moment he sent Mr. Layard as Ambassador to Constantinople, a friendly act towards the Turks, to which they at once replied,—“The Porte is very sensible of this delicate mark of attention.” On 6th April the Russian Chancellor wrote that he regretted that Lord Derby had informed the Porte of the terms of his Declaration, as this could but encourage Turkey in resistance to the wish of Europe. That this was true may be seen from the Italian Green Book, in a despatch dated 5th April from the Italian *Chargé d’Affaires* at Constantinople relating a conversation in which the Turkish

minister said,—“I know that Italy has made a reservation similar to Lord Derby’s Declaration” (we know from the explanations of the Italian Government that but for Lord Derby’s it would not have been made), “and we are glad indeed to see that your Government associates itself with the English Government in sympathy for us.” Of course; and on 9th April the Porte declined the Protocol.

The sad story is soon done. On the 19th April a Russian despatch pointed out that the obstinacy of Turkey in refusing guarantees which Europe had declared necessary had made war certain. On 1st May Lord Derby sent Russia a cross-grained reply, but after the refusal of Turkey to accept any of his plans I fail to see why he should have lectured Russia “for acting,” as Lord Granville has well said, “as she told him all along she would act.”

We now have reached the war; but before we turn to the consideration of the present or the future, I would ask you to take note that I have shown that on at least twelve occasions the European Concert was violated by our Government. These were:—

When they consented, not willingly, like the other Powers, but “with reluctance,” to the consular mission.

When they signed the Andrassy Note only with “hesitation” and delay, though it was accepted by the Turks themselves.

When they sent the fleet to Besika Bay, with the

effect (described by Sir Henry Elliot, who, as he had asked for it to be sent, must have known the real reason why it was sent) that the Turks did not "feel altogether deserted."

When they refused to sign the Berlin Memorandum, agreed to by all the other Powers, including France.

When they allowed Sir Henry Elliot to use pro-Turkish language at a moment when Turkey was defying Europe, with the effect of tempting the Turks into an attitude of confirmed obstinacy, the result of which has been the war.

When in October, 1876, they backed out of the Armistice negotiations, and left Russia to gain by Ultimatum the point in dispute.

When they approved the Guildhall speech made in their name at an official banquet, and breathing isolation as the true policy for England.

When their two representatives at the Conference stated, on December 14th, that British Consuls did not believe in danger to the Christians from the Turks, "whereupon the Ambassadors of each of the five other Powers stated that the reports from their Consuls were in the opposite sense"—(I use Lord Salisbury's words). For, supposing for the sake of argument that the Italian and German Ambassadors were biassed on the Russian side, can that be supposed of *all* the Powers?

When they instructed Sir Henry Elliot to use a different phrase to explain his leaving Constantinople to that made use of by the Ambassadors of the other Powers.

When they replaced Sir Henry Elliot by Mr. Layard.

By Lord Derby's declaration.

By the terms of the despatch of 1st May, 1877.

Such has been the Government policy: isolated, undignified, inconsistent, and unsafe. Members of the Government before war had been declared admitted its inconsistency, but claimed for their policy the one merit of "preventing war." If this was then its object, I am justified in the assertion which I made in September last, that it has failed, and failed with danger and with loss of dignity to England.

In the speech at Chelsea in which I made that statement, I went on to say that, as regarded the future, the war was unlikely to end in 1877, and that the present meeting would give us a further chance to discuss the possible terms of peace to be proposed. My attack upon the utter selfishness of tone which characterized the policy of our Government—a selfishness not even enlightened, but small and blind—was accompanied by the declaration that I could not sympathize with the eulogists of Russia. These guarding words drew down on me a serious charge, laid by a journal conducted with much ability and vigour, but with a good deal of personal prejudice, and laid by that journal in a light-hearted way, as though such charges meant little or nothing, and might be made, as goes the phrase, "without any bones being broken." The *Spectator* alleged against me that Russian ill-success had made me turn round on Russia. Such a charge ought not to

be lightly made against a man, and when made demands to be examined. My want of confidence in Russia is nothing new. Most men who know Russia well dislike the Russian Government, and I have made five journeys in that land. But, on 9th January of last year, standing where I am standing now, when Russia was in the full pride of her unbroken and mysterious strength, and when the mouths of most speakers of both parties were filled with exaggerations of her power, I used language far more outspoken, and examined her position with far more detail (for detail and strong language were needed at that time) than that which I used after she had been beaten, in September. The *Spectator*, which attacked that speech at length, ought at least to have remembered it, and not have charged me with turning round against Russia because of the Russian defeats. On the contrary, my feeling against Russia has ever been a feeling against her bureaucracy—against her Government, with its pretence, and its corruption—with its sham-Liberalism, and its cruelty, and its falsehood, and not against the Russian people; and never did I feel less bitter against Russia than when I spoke in September, after the badness of her Government had been thoroughly exposed, and when defeat had revealed to an astonished world the heroism of her peasant children. The views I expressed in September last, and which so greatly irritated the *Spectator*, were views which I had expressed so long ago as in 1868, in 'Greater Britain,' and which I have repeated several times in addressing you on

Foreign policy. In 1868 I wrote of the "miserable military administration" of Russia, and pointed out that British India alone was stronger, in a military sense, for offensive war, than was the Russian Empire at that moment. In the speeches which I have made during the last year and a half I have, three times in this borough, and once in Parliament, been forced to give my opinion of the Russian Government, because, when all the papers and politicians are taking sides, it is necessary for those of us who do not belong to either side to say so. Each time that I have attacked the Foreign policy of the Government—even at the moment in the autumn of 1876 when the Russian cause was popular in England—and when I have said that I abhor the conduct of the Turks, I have felt bound to add that there lives no Englishman who has a worse opinion of the Government of Russia. I may go further: if it were not idle to talk of individual wishes, I should agree with the Positivists in their address to Midhat Pasha that if the choice were, as they think it is, and as I with dreams of a new Greece do not think, between Russia at Constantinople and Turkey at Constantinople, I should, on the whole, prefer the latter. The Turkish is in ordinary times a less stifling despotism than the Russian. The Turks let any man go to any church, and let any man read any book. The Russians do not; and in such a position of power as Constantinople I should prefer the Turks, if, as I do not think, the choice lay only there.

I have always tried to avoid mere general state-

ments about Russia. Even in the few words I spoke about her in September I gave the heads of my reasons for disapproving of her Government. I protested against a foolish confidence in the Liberal sympathies of a power "absolutely autocratic, eaten up with pecuniary corruption, unacquainted with real liberty of conscience, and which crushed the Poles during the present reign with every circumstance of atrocity." The *Spectator* thinks I said all this to please an anti-Russian public; but how about my speeches of the recess of 1876, when I said the same thing at much greater length at a moment when the Russians were popular with the Liberals? An honest man cannot change quickly opinions formed with thought and care. The opinion which, as a European Liberal, I hold of Russia has this much importance, that I agree with what the first Napoleon said in those St. Helena days, when he was acting Liberalism for the benefit of his historic character and of his line—that "it is necessary to set up a guaranteed kingdom formed of Constantinople and its provinces to serve as a barrier against Russia." The open question for discussion is whether the present Turkey serves the purpose. The autocracy of Russia is admitted, but she is to have a Constitution soon, we're told. Yes, perhaps! we shall see; but I shall be mistaken if, when granted—if it be granted—it do not prove one of those Constitutions in which the last word is with the Crown. Denmark has a Constitution, and all the forms of freedom obtain in the elections to her

Parliament; but because the King does not like the Radical majority that the country sends he collects taxes as did Charles the First, but as no King of England in these days would dare to do. For a time the present King of Prussia did the same. Will it not be so in Russia, too, unless the servility of the country returns a majority more monarchic than the Tsar. Of what use to set an elaborate machinery in motion unless to let a country rule itself? Autocracy is more respectable than sham constitutionalism, which is a mere concession in form to modern opinion, and worse than useless to the countries where it obtains. Russia is still, at all events, a pure autocracy, where life and liberty are at the mercy of the police, and the police are the creatures of the great One-Man, or of the One-Man's favourite. Russia is the great Tory power; and it is hard to see why, in a conflict between the two chief Tory powers, English Tories should sympathize so strongly with the one which, owing to her weakness is on the whole the less Tory of the two. The autocracy of Russia is admitted, I repeat,—and after the reverses of the present war her corruption, long known to those who know her well,—her corruption is exposed. It is summed up in the saying of the Russian civil officer, "If the Emperor in his goodness were to give me a canary-bird to keep, out of that canary-bird I'd keep my family." The autocracy and the corruption are but backwardness, perhaps, and Russia is so backward that to travel there is to travel in the past, just as to travel in America is to travel in the

future. This backward country was once already in the present century looked up to by the English Liberals, and it is but little changed from the time when its ruler, also a self-styled Liberal like his present namesake and successor, accepted as the leader of the European Liberals, invented the Holy Alliance for the suppression of the liberties of Europe, and called Castlereagh himself a Radical. A year ago I went into the whole history of the Emancipation, and of the Polish insurrection of 1863, in order to show how little we could count on the Liberal sympathies of the present Alexander, whose praises at that moment were in every Liberal mouth. I did not, as some do, style the Russians "barbarous," and leave matters there. I did not make use of vaguely abusive terms, but gave reasons for all I have said. You may call any nation "barbarous" if you look only to certain isolated facts. The French call us "barbarous," when they are told that we retain flogging for our garotters and for the sailors of our fleets. Nothing that we could say of Russia in those general terms, the use of which I deprecate, can equal what Heine said of us in similar manner, when he called England "A country which Ocean would long ago have swallowed, had he not feared that it would make him sick." But, then, Heine's knowledge of England was somewhat imperfect, being entirely acquired from his barber, Mr. White, and he wrote about us before he was able to read a word of English, and when Mr. White and his landlady were his only English friends. When any one

tells you that Russia is worse than Turkey, and at the end of her national existence,—or, on the other hand, that she is the noblest and most disinterested of powers,—think of Heine's barber, Mr. White, and reflect that possibly your informant does not thoroughly understand all the bearings of the case. It is sad to see some small portion of the English public fluctuating between the extreme views in each direction—views equally full of error and of danger; for as these men were ready a year ago to forget all past crimes of the Russian Government, and even the shameful Polish horrors of the present reign, and to cheer for Humanity, Christianity, and Russia, so now these same men are credulous of the reforming zeal of Constantinople Pachas, and are shouting "To Gallipoli," as the corresponding class in Paris in 1870 shouted "To Berlin." Let us pray them to obey the Spanish proverb, and "not turn one piece of folly into two." There is not only too much of credulousness, but also too much of incredulousness about just now in England. The untruthful violence of partisans has caused many to forget or to deny the plainest lessons of a not distant past,—to speak as though Mouravieff had never ruled at Wilna, or Chefket Pacha at Tatar Bazardjik, the one ruffian decorated and promoted by the present "reforming Sultan," and the other decorated and promoted by the present "clement Tsar." Let them remember how the French statesman told his son that he must not overdo incredulity, "for there are facts which are true *even* though they are to be found in History."

“Six of one and half-a-dozen of the other”; is that, then, my belief? As regards the two Governments it is. But as regards the two peoples and their future, that convenient English phrase would form a somewhat imperfect key to my opinions. With all my anti-Russian views, formed ten years ago, and repeatedly expressed, I believe firmly in the future that lies before the Russian people. Of the Turks I cannot say as much. I admit that in a certain sense they are a splendid race. You may remember that I prophesied the military stand that they would make when speaking here a year ago, —and in these words:—“I believe in the incurable malady and inevitable ultimate death of the Turkish power,.....but because the sick men must die some day, we need not expect that they should die at once, and they have over and over again put forth great military strength at the moment when their neighbours were shaking their heads over their condition.” The Turks are a fine fighting people (if you take away the Constantinople “ring”), not suited to our modern ways—out of place in modern Europe as they stand, but as fit as their kinsmen, old foes and present friends, the Magyars, to take their place as Europeans in the course of time. The Russians are more than this. Their vast numbers alone make it certain that for good or evil they must be a more important factor in the production of the future Europe. You cannot judge of what they will be by what they are. To compare the Russia of to-day to the Russia that is to come is to compare Chaos to the

Universe. There are forty millions of Great Russians speaking a single dialect, and with hearts which in national controversies beat as one. There are nearly half as many Little Russians and other Slavonic tribes who look to Russian leadership of the Slavonic race, and who live within the boundaries of Russia. The Russians are sixty millions without counting the Slavonic but hostile Poles, and who shall say that even Poland may not yet become a strength rather than a weakness to a reconstituted Russia? The Russians are not only sixty millions of men, but of patient, cheerful, frugal, hard-working peasantry. Not temperate, indeed, but given to the use of ardent spirits—a vice which the frightful climate of the country they inhabit accounts for if it does not excuse, and a vice which in the warmer Caucasus the Russian settlers show themselves able to shake off. Not only sixty millions, too, but sixty millions with other millions outside their frontiers, who look to them for lead, and with a vast untouched corn-growing country at their back in which to multiply to as many millions more. If by "Russia" we mean the leading Slavonic power, whether a Russia one-and-indivisible, or a Slavonian confederation, we mean one of the greatest forces of the future.

We must not let the splendid courage of the Turkish troops blind us to the fact that we have in Turkey a nation in decay—a state the duration of which as a European power can be counted by years. The Turks first took Constantinople only in 1453. In 1594 they were so powerful in

the Mediterranean as to address an ultimatum to the City of Marseille. As late as 1683 they lay before Vienna, but from that time they have steadily been driven back. Why? It is not enough to say—because they are mere soldiers—nothing but “a conquering horde.” If it comes to that, the English in India may be called “a conquering horde”; and yet I differ from Mr. Lowe, and do not think that they will be driven out. What were the Magyars but “a conquering horde” of the worst type? What were our ancestors, we may ask? Consult the Roman historians on them, and you will not look upon a flattering picture; it could hardly have been blacker had Heine drawn it. After all, it might be said, the Turks have outlived as a nation their most ancient and most brilliant enemies, the Poles, now, like their other ancient enemies the Magyars, of whom I spoke just now, their friends. But the fact that the English hold India firmly,—the fact that the Magyars, through a combination of circumstances, have come to hold rule in Austria,—cannot be much of a consolation to the Constantinople “ring.” It is not by Turkish courses that we hold India; not by Turkish courses that the Magyars have been able, and that perhaps only for a time, to hold their own against the Slavs. In spite of the words of a great German historian, who has ridiculed the “men who have discovered in the Turk characteristics which would have done honour to the Roman,” I will dare to say that a Turkish population, brave, proud, sober, and laborious, may very

possibly continue to exist in Europe for all time, but that population will not always form the Pasha's Government that now blights the fairest lands of Europe—rose-clad Roumelia and glorious Crete. But, it may be said, "if all the faults of Turkey are only the faults of the Turkish Government, why should not Russia, with, by your own showing, as bad a Government, fare as ill?" Because Russia has eighty-six millions of people, of whom sixty millions form a united people of the ruling race; because she occupies geographically an inexpugnable position; because her Government itself, though German in time of peace, is national in time of war. In the compass of these few phrases lies the difference. If the Russian Government, with all its sins, were also the Government of a minority, alien in creed, in tongue, in race, from the peasantry of the land; if it ruled over eight instead of eighty millions, and were seated in the most coveted position in the world, then the fall of Russia might be easily foretold. The Turks form a mere army of soldiers and camp-followers, scattered over a large territory, in which they rule a hostile people far more numerous than themselves. In the pride of religion and of race the Turkish Government steadily oppressed the major part of its European subjects until external interference in the present century caused it to promise them "reforms." In 1840 the Turks were greatly frightened, and promised much. Fresh "reforms" have been promised within the last few years. I have carefully compared the promises of our day with those of Reschid Pacha in 1840, and

cannot see much progress. I have heard from those in the secrets of the trade that all kinds of jam, whatever their varieties of colour or delicate shades of taste, are made of apple. So, all Turkish promises are of one material—paper. Sultan Mahmoud, Reschid, Aali, Fuad, and other Pachas, in 1835, 1838–40, 1856, 1858, and 1868, have been spoken of in the same terms as were used of Midhat in 1876, and even the gloomy tyrant Sultan Abdul-Aziz was at one time called by half the newspapers in Europe “the reforming Sultan.” Indeed, he was all but killed by the Old-Turks in 1868 because of his “reforms.” With all this talk, matters—in practice, not in theory—stand at Constantinople where they stood when our great-grandfathers were alive. A few concessions, wrung from weakness,—for in the days of strength none were made,—have not conciliated the subject peoples, while they have, even though nominal, yet by their very terms grievously wounded the pride of the governing race. Of fusion between the peoples there is no sign. Compare the fusion which had taken place within four hundred years of conquest between the Norman conquerors of England and the Saxo-British conquered,—between the Frankish conquerors of Gaul and the conquered Celts, with the absence of fusion between the Turkish conqueror and the Greek and Slav inhabitants of the country which he claims. In countries where a similar want of fusion between conquerors and conquered has been seen, as was the case in the Low Countries between the Austro-Spanish rulers and

the Dutch and Flemish peoples, and where the foreign government has been bad, the foreigner has in the end been driven out. Foreigner the conqueror still is in Turkey, and driven out he in the end will be, though not perhaps by Russia, and probably not just now. During the last hundred years the Turkish power has rapidly declined. In 1839-40 it was saved only from destruction by the intervention of the troops of the Great Powers. The decomposition of Turkey is evidenced by the fact that each time that she is shaken a bit drops off. Not to name Algeria, over which her hold was slight, and Egypt, which is not yet lost in name, the Crimea, Bessarabia, Servia, Greece, and the Roumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, have been lost in turn. As regards the European provinces still subject to Turkish rule, it is impossible, I think, to doubt that the great majority of their inhabitants desire to escape from the government under which they find themselves. Of the late revolt it may be said that it was produced by foreign influence, and I myself pointed out at Ladbroke Hall, in August, 1876, how that influence had been employed. But foreign influence could not produce revolt in the provinces, say of France. Foreign influence did not produce the causes of revolt, the state of feeling without which revolt would be impossible. It is easy to push the argument drawn from "foreign influence" too far. Revolt in Turkey is no new thing. Did "foreign influence" produce the revolt in Greece? On the contrary, Russia herself, still

bound in the promises of the Holy Alliance, for five or even for six years did all she could to throw cold water on the movement. I repeat that it is difficult honestly to doubt but that the inhabitants of the European provinces of Turkey desire to escape from the Turkish Government. As a Liberal I sympathize with their attempts to escape from it, when I find not only the wish to escape, but the fact that the government complained of cannot give to these people who would be rid of it the real advantages of good government. Turkey is behind the rest of Europe in railroads, roads, posts, telegraphs, and she extorts from her subjects severe taxation by wasteful and cruel modes. The countries thus misgoverned are by nature incredibly rich: they are the choicest parts of Europe—perhaps of the whole world. The Bulgarian, Slav, and Greek inhabitants of European Turkey, with the exception of a portion of the Greeks who, employed by the Turkish Government, are more Turkish than the Turks, are well aware, by long experience, of the uselessness of asking Turkey for reforms. They do not wish for a reformed Turkish Government, but for no Turkish Government at all. Except so far as “British Interests” may interfere,—and of these I will soon speak,—English Liberals must sympathize with their desire, who sympathized with Venice, for the government against which they cry out is not only an alien government, but an alien government which governs ill—a government which, far worse than that under which Venice languished, does not fulfil the ends for which

government itself exists. What, too, does experience teach us as to the position of the races that have been subject to the Turks? Can any one pretend that Transylvania, for instance, is not better off in every way than if it had continued to be Turk? The Greek kingdom is a failure, we are told! Greece, liberated by the wise foresight of Mr. Canning, but left, on his ill-timed death, without Thessaly, Epirus, Crete, has been starved and shorn by the Great Powers. As once said Lafayette, "the greater part of Greece was left out of Greece." What kind of Greece is a Greece which does not include Lemnos, Lesbos, or Mitylene, Chio, Mount Olympus, Mount Ossa, and Mount Athos? Not only the larger part, but the most Greek part of Greece was omitted from the Hellenic kingdom. Crete and the other islands, the coast of Thrace, and the Greek colony at Constantinople, are the Greek Greece indeed, for Continental Greece within the limits of the kingdom is by race half Slav and half Albanian. We must not, however, attach too much importance to this fact, for in all times the Greeks have been a little people, grafting themselves on to various barbaric stocks. Race is a small thing by the side of national spirit, and in national spirit the Greeks are as little Slav as the Italians are Teutonic. Even the corrupting influence of long slavery, and it was deep indeed, had not touched this spirit, and the very thieves and robbers of the hills of Greece made for themselves in Byron's day a glorious name in history. I do not think that Greece has failed. I believe in

Greece—believe in the ultimate replacement of the Turkish State by powerful and progressive Greece, attached in friendship to France and England her creators—an outpost of Western Europe in the East; and I think the day will come when even Homer's city may once more be Greek.

That which we ought at this moment to consider is not the desirability, but the possibility, of Turkey's downfall. A fear of Russia, a just dislike of the Russian Government, or even, if any go so far, a very hatred of the Russian race, are not reasons why we should refuse to face this possibility. On the contrary, it is needful, in order to avoid peril to this country arising from the sudden heat of a surprise, that it should be faced. But if for one last instant we look to sympathies before we turn wholly to the thought of interests, I cannot concur in the sympathy which has been shown of late for the Turkish State. Speaking now in this for myself alone, and not pretending to speak for all of you, I cannot allow that the exhibition of physical courage ought to affect our sympathies. Doubtless the Turks have fought well, but to fight is not enough; and even their soldier-prophet has said in his Koran, "The ink of the sage is more precious than the blood of the martyr," or, in other words, a race is not to be saved by ferocity in war alone. Speaking, I repeat, for myself, I not only believe that the Ottoman power in Europe is likely to continue steadily to decline, but I think that it deserves to do so, and that the crimes of its rulers rob it of all just claim upon our sympathies. Not

to go back to a past which has been the subject of too much discussion, and not to go into detail, the butcheries of Philippopolis in September last rival Mouravieff's butcheries at Wilna, and disgust us with the Turks as the latter disgusted us with the Russians. In neither case, I may explain, have I in view the execution of insurgents taken in arms. I cannot, however, mention either of these cases without again reminding you (although, by so doing, in August, 1876, I called down upon myself the thunder of the *Spectator*) of our own behaviour in India in 1857, and in Jamaica at an even later date. The Indian Terror, a Terror following a real rebellion; but the Jamaica Terror, like the Terror in Bulgaria, caused by the fears of a governing minority, and always to be remembered as forming a dreadful warning to ourselves to watch our own course in future, that it may be wholly free from the misdeeds which we reproach to others. As I pointed out to you last year, foreign nations think that we English have been, up to the present day, the greatest offenders among nations in the manner in which we have dealt with revolts, or supposed or expected revolts. Such acts as those of Jamaica cannot now be committed with the impunity which attended them in the past. International opinion is in these days more quickly aroused than was formerly the case, and it is not unpatriotic to express the hope that the ebullitions now caused in England by the cruelties of other powers may have the effect of preventing in the future the commission by the forces of all

nations of acts less evil indeed than those committed by the Turks in 1876, but evil enough to disgrace that civilization which we represent. As regards Bulgaria, the atrocities of the one side cannot excuse those of the other. Those who take the same view that I take of Turkish government have shown a disposition to palliate the shameful deeds committed by the Bulgarians in June, 1877, and have held them excused by the recollection of May, 1876. I do not share this view. It would be fairer to allow that they are inexcusable, but to plead that these ill-deeds were the cruelties of the slave, so taught by centuries of brutal and corrupt oppression. Let us compare, however, with these horrible reprisals that which took place at and after the evacuation of Milan by Radetski's Croats in 1848. These troops had committed deeds too shameful to be described before you. The Italians in the hour of their triumph spared even the lives of the Croat soldiers, who immediately afterwards fell into husbands' and fathers' hands. Such has been the behaviour of man in this latest war of this most "advanced" of ages, that we might almost fall in with Schopenhauer, and address a bad dog, who fights for fighting sake, and kills for love of killing, by the degraded name of "Man"!

I invite you to recognize in the present war a conflict between two corrupt and cruel governments, with neither of which can Liberals feel sympathy, but behind one of which are ranged powerful forces of the future.

What, then, is to be the outcome of the conflict, and what is our own relation to it?

Let us first look to Treaties. In two Queen's Speeches, and in other public declarations, the Government have spoken of the "Integrity and Independence" of the Ottoman Empire. That phrase has relation to a Treaty obligation,—not towards Turkey. We are not bound by Treaty to defensive alliance with the Turks. Some of you no doubt observed that during the last Session Mr. Courtney placed a notice upon the Paper of the House of Commons, in which he proposed to call attention to the Treaty of Paris and to the Tripartite Treaty of 1856, and to ask us to declare that the continued bad government of Turkey released us from all our obligations to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. I do not know whether my friend claims descent from the four Courtenays, Emperors of Constantinople, but if he does, it is magnanimous of him to stand up for the freedom of Bulgaria, the people of which country destroyed the Courtenays' rule. With regard to the terms of Mr. Courtney's notice, it cannot, I think, be truly said that, under the Treaty of Paris, there exists, or ever existed, any obligation to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by force of arms and at the call of Turkey. Our obligations are those which we undertook in the Tripartite Treaty. That Treaty is a fighting Treaty. It is couched in the strongest form of words which the diplomatists possess in their vocabulary. Its terms, for instance, are much stronger than are those of

the Quintuple Treaty, the Treaty of 1839, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, for the maintenance of which it is always assumed that we should fight. The Tripartite Treaty was made in 1856 between England, Austria, and France, the signature of Austria being the "stupendous ingratitude" memorable in history. It binds the three Powers to a joint and several guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to resist all infractions of the Treaty of Paris by force of arms. If at the close of the war dispositions in violation of any clause of the Treaty of Paris, or of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, be proposed, as is certain to be the case, we must, on the call of France or Austria, break the Treaty or we must fight. Let us suppose, after Lord Derby's words, that we shall not make a call ourselves. Let us assume that France is too desirous of peace to make one. There still remains a possibility that Austria, finding her interests in peril in spite of the "Three Emperors' League," may call on England and on France. The Treaty is so strong in its terms that even the refusal of France would not excuse us; and we must either declare that circumstances have so changed that the Treaty, made in 1856, and "strengthened," we are told, by the events of 1871, is already dead, or else we must fight, with Austria and Turkey for allies. In spite of the danger, I confess that I cannot see that Mr. Courtney's position is tenable. He says that the continued bad government of Turkey has released us from the Tripartite Treaty. But whether you look to the

words of the Tripartite Treaty, or to the history of the circumstances under which it was drawn up, that Treaty is not one made in the interest of Turkey. It is a Treaty in defence of the interests, or supposed interests, of England, Austria, and France; and it would be no answer to Austria, when she complained to us that her interests were being disregarded in the terms of peace, to tell her that Turkey had been ill-governed. I take it that Mr. Courtney was never in favour of the Tripartite Treaty: he never would have made it at all. He is one, I think, of those who disapprove of the Crimean war and, generally, of the form of the Treaties concluded at its close. But what are those who *made* the Tripartite Treaty to say to Austria? What are they to say who proposed distinctly to renew it in 1871, and who, though it was not renewed in terms, claimed, in answer to me on the 30th March, 1871, to have given it fresh strength? I understand the position of Mr. Courtney, for when he used the words "the continued injustice, corruption, and cruelty" of the Turkish rule, he meant that the Turkish government was unjust, corrupt, and cruel even before 1856 and 1871. What he feels, I think, is not so much that this "injustice, corruption, and cruelty" releases us from our obligations to Austria and France, as that the Turkish rule has always been so bad that it was a monstrous folly not to have seen in 1856 that it could not be preserved. I cannot but believe, however, that the statesmen who contracted the obligations of the Tripartite

Treaty were well aware of the badness of the Turkish rule, and signed the Treaty, not because they admired or approved of Turkey, but because they thought the interests of England best served by the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Were those of them who survive in power, I should be curious to see what sort of an answer they would make to a demand by Austria for troops under the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty. It is clear, however, from Lord Derby's words in the House of Lords last Session, that if called on by Austria under the Tripartite Treaty he would take up the position of Mr. Courtney, and would declare that the face of affairs is so changed since 1856 that the Treaties of that year are dead. I had sooner he had to write the despatch than that I had to write it; but as long as he is Foreign Minister we may consider that we have to cut ourselves clear of the Tripartite Treaty, and to make a fresh departure. Were the opinions of Lord Beaconsfield shared by all his colleagues the matter would not stand thus.

To take the terms of peace that are talked of now, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire would be violated by the annexation of Batoum to Russia, to which, however, our Government seem resigned, but would not be violated by the concession of autonomy to Bulgaria. The institution of autonomous states continues a shadow of integrity to Turkey after the substance has disappeared. In the interest even of Turkey herself, and certainly in the interest of European peace, I am opposed to

the creation of fresh tributary states. If territory is to be taken from Turkey, let it be taken for good and all. The tributary states are no strength to Turkey, but, on the contrary, are always looking out for the chance of winning complete freedom by the sword. For this reason they are a standing menace to European peace. Two of them, parts of the "Ottoman Empire" in its "integrity," are fighting against Turkey in the present war. Greece, not tributary, but independent, has hitherto remained at peace. The interests of Turkey cannot be served by a nominal retention of her authority when the reality is gone. It is curious to find Russia demanding the independence of Roumania in the suggested terms of peace. On 19th June, 1848, Russia addressed a despatch to her representatives abroad to justify the entrance of Russian troops into Walachia to suppress a Constitutional movement in that state. In this despatch the Russian Chancellor wrote,—“It is enough to say that the principle of the sovereignty of the people is raised by the Walachians to show the most flagrant violation of the sovereign rights of the Sultan of Turkey.....They wish also to restore their ancient nationality.....to constitute under the name of the Dacio-Rouman kingdom a new, separate, and independent state.....Russia, no more than Turkey, could afford to see arise..... a new state which, too weak to stand alone, would sooner or later fall under the influence or domination of other powers.” Times are changed, indeed! It is strange to see how many

of the suppressed attempts of 1848 form the main features of the Europe of to-day:—United Germany; United Italy; dual Austro-Hungary; Independent Roumania; Republican France; some of the points of the People's Charter, some of the demands of the petition of the 10th April, granted here!

If peace negotiations should be seriously pursued, our Government are unlikely, it seems, to quarrel with Russia over the adoption of the Conference Programme for Bulgaria, over the frontiers of Servia and Montenegro, over the Independence of Roumania, or the cession of Batoum, although, with regard to this last point, it is worth noting that, to judge by his letter, published in Friday's papers, Mr. Roebuck would go to war with Russia to prevent her from acquiring a single yard of land. But there remains "the passage of the Dardanelles," which may also be asked for in the terms of peace. Its concession, which it is possible that Germany, Austria, and Italy may agree to recommend, will largely increase our estimates. I do not share the views of those Liberal speakers who think that it should be yielded as a matter of course. But to fight about it is another thing. We should have no ally, and we might find that Germany would seize the moment to make movements which would be far more dangerous to our safety. In 1871 we might have prevented, without the smallest risk of war, the de-neutralization of the Black Sea. I thought that we should have done so, and moved a resolution to that effect.

The country thought otherwise, and the Tory party refused even to divide against the course that was pursued. But after our giving up of the neutralization of the Black Sea in 1871—a renunciation which I for one opposed in the interests of peace—I do not see that the mere right of passage is a matter on which we stand out against all Europe. Before 1871 the Russians and Turks were both bound by Treaty for the sake of peace to keep no fleets in the Black Sea. Since the denunciation of the Treaty by the Russians, both can keep a fleet, and the Turks possess a strong one, the Russians a weak. Now the “passage” is rather a matter of might than of right, and the “right” is not in itself of great importance. The important fact would be the possession by Russia in the Black Sea of a fleet of enormous power, and that she may one day possess whether she obtains or does not obtain “the right of passage.” In 1871 you would not have had to fight, because Austria and Italy were warmly on our side. At the present time, and upon the present form of the question, they are against us. There is a humiliation to Russia in the present state of things, to be allowed a fleet but not to move it. There was none in the state of things before 1871, no more than there is a humiliation to France in the neutralization of French India by treaties under which she is bound to keep no soldiers and to erect no fortresses in her Indian territories. But in this matter, again, we see the isolation of our Government. The destruction by them of the concert of Europe has had that effect which we pro-

phesied over and over again. This is the outcome of that "spirited foreign policy" which has proved to be a policy of bluster instead of acts, and which has disgusted Europe. How differently do things appear than at the time when Parliament was told, after the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, that a Tory Government had at once made England the arbiter of Europe—that "our country took the lead." Why, we stand alone, absolutely alone, in face of terms of peace which we dislike but can't resist. Turkey is crushed, about whose integrity the Tory party raved. Russian influence will have risen and English influence fallen in the East. Greece, the anti-Russian friend of England, is not to gain. Servia and Montenegro, the tools of Russia, are to be rewarded. Bulgaria is to owe its freedom not to Europe but to Russia. England can do nothing but hold five cabinets in a week, and so proclaim her isolation to the world. What would the Tories have said if a Liberal administration had been in power!

The "passage of the Dardanelles" reminds me of one question in which our Government, who can talk of nothing but "British Interests," have disregarded real British interests in the most flagrant way. I mean that of the Turkish Black Sea blockade. I brought this matter three times to the notice of the House of Commons in July and August last, and showed the inefficiency of the blockade, its fatal effect on the British Eastern trade, and how by bribery Greek and even Russian merchants were allowed to break it down. It was

left, I am ashamed to say, for Italy to vindicate the rights of neutrals, from the violation of which England, far more than Italy, had suffered. The new Tory policy, indeed, consists in talking much and doing nothing—in making up for the want of acts by the use of words. To judge from one recent agricultural-dinner speech that I have read, the Conservative platform is made up of cursing Russia, and demanding that foreign cattle and Irish Members of Parliament shall be “slaughtered at the port of embarkation.”

So much for the terms of peace that are now proposed; but how if the war goes on? “There is many a slip ’twixt the cup and the lip” when you are dealing with a Bismarck, a Jomini or a Hamburger, and a Turk. Our interposition, which I have already condemned, is far from having mended matters, and I do not think that it was meant to mend them. The Turks are very naturally trying to involve us on their side, and *if* they asked us to “approach the Tsar,” it was, of course, in the hope that we should be drawn in. The renewal of active operations in the spring means the break-up of the Turkish Empire, or, at all events, will bring that disruption, and a partition, within the realms of possibility. Want of money will not cause Russia to terminate the war. Machiavel has truly said, that “nothing is more false than the common belief that money is the sinew of war.” As he argues, if money gave victory, Darius would have conquered Alexander. Solon told Croesus that war is not made with gold

but with iron, and in this war there has been little gold but much iron on both sides. If the war should go on, we shall have events which ought not to cause panic in this country, but which undoubtedly will cause it. When I say that they will cause, but ought not to cause, panic, I have in view the fact that we are more nervous about our position now than we were at the time of the last but one of Russo-Turkish wars, for the parallel between the two cases would only continue to be as close as it has been close up to the present time. Then, as now, we had a despatch before war broke out, in which Russia assured the courts that "The Russian army is only mobilized to execute the decisions of the Powers: now, as formerly, and as in the future, if it marches it will march, not to advance the frontiers of the Russian Empire, but to consolidate the peace of Europe." You see that the Russians have been using up their old despatches. This despatch was not printed at the time by the Governments to which it was addressed, and Russia herself seldom prints despatches, so that they "will do again." Then, as now, we had an autograph letter to the Emperor of Austria, for had not the great Jomini (father to the Jomini I named just now) declared that "for Russia to invade Turkey without knowing the intentions of Austria is for her to run into a mouse-trap"? Then, as probably now, Alexander (for it was before the accession of Nicholas who was to carry through the war) wrote to Francis, "The military measures of Russia will not have in view an exclusively Russian end, but will, on the con-

trary, leave to the powers" the ultimate decision of the destinies of the East. History indeed repeats itself, for then, as now, there was a mission of an *aide-de-camp* of the Emperor Alexander to the Emperor Francis to assure him of his desire to avoid interference with Austrian interests. Then there was an English ministry of whom Gervinus writes, that "as real Tories" (it is his word, not mine) "they were honestly hostile to the pretensions of the rayahs, and to their insurrection, and saw in them but a mass of despicable and contemptible people. Their duty was to prevent a Russo-Turkish war; not to improve the condition of the rayahs." Then, as now, a pro-Turkish English Ambassador at Constantinople was forced, in the interest of Turkey, though against his wish, she denying the commission of atrocities which were doing her harm in English opinion, to send an English mission from Constantinople to the scene of the atrocities, which reported, as Mr. Baring reported, that they had occurred. Then, as now, a man of wondrous eloquence wrote pamphlets, in which the cruelties of Turkey were denounced. I speak of Erskine. The English Tories, who wished to fight the Russians, had to give way to outraged opinion, and the pro-Turkish Ambassador of England, then, as now, had to see the Sultan, and to speak of the "impression which has been produced in England by these horrors." Then, as now, Turkey's reply to Europe was that she could not allow of interference in her internal affairs. Then, as now, Prussia was hand-in-glove with Russia.

Then, as now, an Emperor Alexander and a Russian Imperial Chancellor were strongly opposed to war, and were forced towards it; but, however, Moscow influence being less in those days than in ours, war did not actually break out for some years instead of months. There is the only difference between the cases. The parallel goes much further, and it is to the later points that I would lead you. The extraordinary resemblances still hold. England could have prevented the war, but preferred a policy of isolation. The Tory ministers and the Tory papers talked war and wrote war, but would not fight. Then, as now, the Russians under-estimated the Turkish military power. They declared war, crossed the Danube, suffered severe repulse, found their numbers insufficient, but advanced fast, were again checked, sent for the guards from Petersburg, at the same dates as now. Fraud was discovered in the Russian contracts, then as ever, and their numbers had been fraudulently overstated then as now. Yet, then as now, a successful winter campaign brought Turkey on her knees. Now comes the point which made me ask you to turn your attention to these facts. Then, as I fear may possibly now happen, the earlier peace negotiations failed, and Russia took both Adrianople and Erzeroum. To read our English papers now, you would think that the fall of either meant the death of England. Yet Russia then held both, and gave them up, and kept the promise she had made to England and to Austria that she would not take territory in Europe. This was a moment when, though

the Russians were weak in numbers, they were virtually unopposed, and it was an "isolated peace," a separate peace, made at Adrianople, with a Russian advance-guard on the Constantinople road, and with the Russians in Asia, holding Erzeroum ! To keep her word, Russia actually refused Moldavia, which was pressed on her by Turkey. I don't say that she refused from modesty or from moderation,—very likely she refused from fear ; but motives do not matter provided the refusal be there ; and the same motives, if they were fear of England and of Austria, must be in operation now. It may be pleaded that in 1828 the Russians made an easy peace because their country was exhausted. It is true that Russia was exhausted, and so she may be this time ; but the Turks were in still worse plight, and publicly confessed that they were at her mercy, and must yield what terms she chose. All is comparative in exhaustion after war, and it was Frederick the Great who said that victorious campaigns of Russians against Turks were ever victories of the one-eyed over the blind. One word more, and I end my comparison between 1878 and 1828. Some English politicians in 1828 attacked the Tory Government for having, by their attitude of isolation, led up to a separate peace, and said that in the interests of England they would have preferred a European partition, and the creation of a real bulwark, instead of a sham one, against Russia. It is possible that this line may yet be taken by many Liberals, under the lead of Mr. Gladstone.

If the war should go on, and Russia crush

down Turkey to the ground and cause anarchy at Constantinople, even though with the result of fearful suffering and prostration to herself, Russia will not be able to ask much compensation. She will not have advanced her frontiers a yard towards Constantinople in the present century, except on the Asiatic side of the Black Sea, and no one seriously believes that she is going to reach the Bosphorus by way of Asia. If Russia destroys the Turkish Empire as it now exists, it is Austria, England, Greece, and Italy who will appear as heirs. Unwilling Austria will find herself compelled to accelerate her conversion into a Slavonic state by accepting the fatal gift of Bosnia, an increase of territory which may destroy that unhappy hybrid power, "Felix" since 1848, no longer. Already we see Italy upon the watch, whose claims in a partition are kept all times in view by the titles of her kings, who claim to be legitimate sovereign princes of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Jerusalem, but who would be glad to exchange these vague and shadowy titles for Albania and Tunis. There remain the claims of Greece on Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, and perhaps on even more of the territories inhabited by her race, and of England upon Egypt; and one reason why I have attempted to-night to count chickens not yet hatched is because great writers have already discussed the conditions of the Anglo-Egyptian problem, which has even been the cause of internecine warfare between Mr. Gladstone and the *Spectator*. To what I have already said of Greece

I will only add that the gradual substitution of Greece for Turkey ought to be popular with the English. A force of the future instead of a force of the past; a force of trade, rather than a force of war; European, instead of Asiatic; intensely independent, democratic, maritime! Those who do not wish eventually to see Slavonic claims pushed much more far than justice needs, should speak their word on behalf of Greece.

As for Egypt, there is much to be said for the view not only that it ought in the event of a partition of Turkey to fall to our share, but that even as matters stand our road to India should not be in the hands of a power so weak, so exposed to frequent war, as Turkey. The alternatives are the Khedive's independence, or annexation to Great Britain, for it is clear that we have passed the point of tolerating the annexation of Egypt by any other European power. The independence of Egypt means the continuation of the present infamous government of Egypt by a man who is, perhaps, the greatest robber that ever sat upon a throne. I have often addressed you upon the abominable nature of his rule—a foreign despotism, brutal and corrupt, resting upon the slavery of the whole Egyptian people. The Khedive, in these days of danger, thinks it prudent to say that he has reformed. He has sent away his opera *troupe*; he no longer gambles in his own Government securities; he has made “a treaty for the suppression of the slave-trade.” The wretched fellaheen, once beaten by the Khedive's officers to extort from them illegal exactions, in addition to

the grinding legal tax, in the name of the Khedive, are now beaten, for the same purpose, by the Khedive's officers, in the name of Mr. Goschen. That is the improvement. The Khedive abolishes the slave-trade on the frontiers of Abyssinia and near the Mountains of the Moon, at the very moment that he is converting the whole population of the fertile delta of Egypt into slaves. The effect of an English annexation upon the development of all Africa would be instantaneous and immense. British annexation would be the only means of suppressing slavery, now nominally put down but in reality supported by the Khedive, often styled by his creditors, in the days when he used to pay them the interest for their loans, "the civilizing ruler," but in whom they now begin to recognize that which we, who are not his creditors, have long known he is—the rapacious sensualist, whose only "civilization" consists in turning Cairo into a *café-chantant*. This smooth-spoken despot, who formerly employed as finance minister Ismail Sadyk Pacha, one of the worst scoundrels that ever lived, has lately shown his well-known desire to "reorganize Egyptian finance" by plundering and murdering his minister, and selling his household slaves for money. Such is our august ally.

So far as Egyptian annexation could harm or weaken us it is accomplished, for by our Suez purchase, and our communications to Russia during the present war, we have virtually bound ourselves never to let any European Power place a soldier

upon Egyptian soil. We must fight for Egypt now, and fight for it without a footing. Why not annex it also for purposes of strength, so that an Egyptian army, reorganized by us, may defend it in our name? Our Government have decided not to go to Egypt. Why? Who would be one penny the worse for the annexation? No one but the Khedive. Not one single creature outside his family, and even they would be compensated by the rise in the Egyptian securities which they hold, or by us, and would, I am sure, look philosophically upon the loss of power if it were replaced by coin. Not one other man in Egypt would deplore the advent of our rule.

Why should we shrink? The Egyptians hate their Turkish masters, and would receive us as deliverers. There is in the world no easier land to rule. Why shrink? Because Mr. Waddington, a most estimable French politician, but a gentleman who, while I will not style him an Englishman, is certainly not all France, told a few English Liberal politicians whom he met at dinner here last year that France would disapprove. Now France, as you well know, has in England no stronger friend than I am, and I would not support a policy that would do harm to France; but surely an Egyptian annexation would rather bind us to French interests than part us from France in our course. France, too, cares more for Syria. But, Mr. Waddington is Foreign Minister, and Mr. Waddington objects. Let him object in peace! Did we prevent France from taking and holding Algeria, at a moment

when we could have stopped it easily? No! We objected, and protested—and so would Mr. Waddington.

What remains, then, to consider? The objections of those who oppose every increase of the Empire. I have no patience with those who condemn all extension of British rule, or with those who blame the former class of politicians in terms so sweeping that they seem to desire to annex the whole known world. I think it folly not to treat each case of annexation upon its merits. For instance, to take one case that has been talked of, I would join Messrs. Biggar and Parnell themselves to “obstruct” the Government from adding Crete to the dominions of Her Majesty. Treating the case upon its merits, I am as convinced that Egypt ought to be acquired, as I am that India must be retained. The possession of Egypt is not necessary to the preservation of our Indian rule, but in the highest degree desirable towards that end. It is not indispensable to England, but would be very advantageous to her, and still more advantageous to the Egyptians.

We have now to complete our examination of the situation by considering the effect on the future of Europe of the prostration of Russia by the war. Austria has shown such wisdom in keeping clear of the conflict that there is reason to believe that she will avoid it altogether. In this case France and Austria will for some years be a match for Germany and Italy, Russia being out of sight, and France will desire to replace a possible Russian by an

actual Austrian alliance. (That odd name for a Prussian statesman)—“The League of the Three Emperors” will be dead. In 1870, by acting in peaceful concert with Austria, we could have prevented its birth. There are few Englishmen who would not be glad to see it die. It bodes no good to freedom. If it has not achieved for itself quite the same unpopularity under its recent name as it did under its old name of the “Holy Alliance,” when Béranger caricatured it as “La Sainte Alliance barbaresque” of “Alger, Tunis, et Maroc,” it is only because it has not yet lasted quite so long. It would, however, be foolish to underrate the strength of Germany, even were she once more to stand alone. It is worth noting with regard to her that she possesses rising statesmen, fit leaders for the morrow. The Crown Prince, himself a man of much intellectual power and of perfect judgment, is surrounded by a group of men able to replace Prince Bismarck. Russia seems not to possess a single man, whether soldier or civilian. France has Gambetta, my eloquent and illustrious friend, but her dukes will not let her use him; and the Catholic Church, with a most short-sighted view of her own interest, seems equally determined that he shall not be President of France. He will. Germany will continue to be strong, but the policy of Germany is peace, provided either that France is isolated as during the last few years, or too well provided with men and friends to be easily attacked, as will be the case for the next few years, I think. The attitude of Germany towards the Eastern

question I can better explain in words ten years old than by any I could find to-day. The French Ambassador who was their author might be supposed to have been writing in the winter of 1877-8, instead of in that of 1867-8, when he tells us of "the pains which Count von Bismarck takes to avoid explaining his views upon the Eastern question. When asked about it, he replies that he never reads the despatches of the Prussian Ambassador at Constantinople. Your Excellency will not forget, however, the complaisance with which he has always lent himself to Prince Gortschakoff's views. He no doubt persuades himself that there are other Powers which have an interest of the highest order in keeping the Turkish Empire out of the clutch of Russia, and he leaves this to them. He knows, too, that no serious change can be carried out at Constantinople without the help, or at least the adhesion, of Germany.....He thinks that he can afford at present to even whet the appetite of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, provided that in return for his services he obtains a benevolent neutrality in regard to anything he pleases to undertake in Germany.....I should not wonder if he were the secret instigator of the new impulsion lately given to the Pan-Slavonic propaganda."

I said just now that I thought that the alliance of the three Emperors would soon be dead. Russia goes on completing her Lithuanian quadrilateral, which can be needed only against Prussia; while Prussia spends millions upon Posen, Thorn, and Koenigsberg, which can be useful only against

Russia. In the same way, while a French minister tells us that "there are no more Alps," so friendly are France and Italy, the French Government goes on spending vast sums upon Toulon, which can be needed only for a war in which Italy and Prussia would be allied, and converts it into a vast intrenched camp, which could be invested only on a line of nine-and-twenty miles. These allies and friends do not seem to like to walk behind one another in so thick a wood as is the Europe of to-day.

This Europe is probably mined beneath our feet with secret treaties,—treaties intended some of them to isolate France in one set of circumstances, and some of them to isolate England in another,—treaties which, through the exhaustion of Russia and the calm duplicity of Austria, will probably fail of their effect,—treaties between Russia and Germany; treaties between Germany and Italy; treaties, less likely to be observed, between Germany and Austria. Here again history may repeat itself. In January, 1815, Prussia, Russia, and Austria (and Austria ruled Italy at that time) were bound by the strongest treaties to union against France. Through the talent of Talleyrand and that historic duplicity of Austria which has often proved a happy disposition for the benefit of Europe, a secret treaty was, behind the backs of Russia and Prussia, concluded between England, Austria, and France, uniting those Powers against Russia and Prussia, already leagued together as they are leagued together now. Talleyrand's

words at Vienna are applicable to the present situation,—“You wish to make of Prussia a barrier against Russia; but what would you say if one day you found that same Prussia lean on that same Russia to obtain in Germany fresh aggrandizement, and in turn back up Russia in an attack on Turkey?”

You may see that, with all respect for the Germany of to-day and for the Russia of the future, I incline to rely for friendship upon Austria and France. When Prince Gortschakoff and King William and the Emperor Alexander have passed away,—when King Frederick William rules in Germany, and the Tsarevitch has become Tsar,—it may be otherwise, but as yet Prussia is too Russian for my sympathies. Why in the same breath declare the duplicity and the decay of Austria, and take her for a friend? National friendships need not, like personal, rest upon a basis of esteem: Austria has the same interests as England, and she will last our time. If she should go to pieces, the new Germany which will then be formed will at the same moment have ceased to be Russian;—that is my reply.

The views which I have laid before you are, I need hardly say, purely individual, and are not, as a whole, those of any party in the state. At the same time, whatever may be the varieties of opinion in our ranks, English Radicals of the present day differ from the Manchester school Radicals of the last generation: most of all in this, that they do not bound their sympathies by the Channel, and

that they take somewhat broader views of policy. In this there is cause for joy, for a Europe without England is as incomplete and as badly balanced—and as heavily weighted against freedom—as that which I two years ago denounced to you,—a Europe without France.

I see reports of English meetings which in the name of "British Interests" ask for war, and although the fire has smouldered for the last few days I fear that it will break out again. On Saturday last I received upon the Mediterranean shore Thursday's *Times* and other papers with Sir Stafford Northcote's circular, stating that on Thursday next the attention of Parliament will "immediately be called to matters of great importance." In face of these unusual words I do not share the optimist views of Sir William Harcourt. The cabinet is for peace, but by its blunders is placed in a position from which some of its supporters wish it to escape by war. I pray for peace. For what are we to fight? Against an extension of Russian boundaries in Armenia, which will be slight, but which if it were great would be better met by an even greater extension of English territories in Egypt. Against "the passage of the Dardanelles," which means in time of war its passage *if Russia can*—a passage which Russia would equally attempt if she *could* but had not the right. Against this we are to fight without allies. Again, let us pray for peace. I will not describe what war must mean:—your sons and brothers killed, or lying crippled amid horrors worse than death; the proceeds of

your toil wrung from you by new taxes; the dear-ness of your children's bread. I have seen too much of war. Four months of it. Too much, at least, for a civilian. No tongue can depict its horrors:—the imagination alone can fitly paint them. It is said that the constituencies are warlike, and that party wire-pullers think that war would be “a good card to play.” I hope and believe that English constituencies would be warlike if real honour and real interests were at stake. If they are warlike now, it is [that they know not war. Are those for war who know its face? There are not in the world more martial countries than the provinces of Eastern France. Are they for war? It is notorious that in them no candidates not pledged to peace can stand a chance. The day may come when England will have to fight for her existence, but for Heaven's sake let us not commit the folly of plunging into war at a moment when all Europe would be hostile to our arms—not one power allied to the English cause.

THE following is the portion of the speech of 9th January, 1877, referred to above:—

.....I will not justify at length the words which I have used with regard to the nature of the Turkish power. To quote words which were applied to another power which has ceased to exist, “There is a degree of bad government which people, great or small, ignorant or enlightened, will no longer in

these days support. It is the one certain progress that in modern civilization has been made that all the nations expect from those who rule them some amount of justice, of good sense, and of care for the interests of all, which shall be greater than that which once sufficed for the maintenance of a society. Powers which will not realize this necessity, and in the long run satisfy it, must pass one by one from fever to collapse, and while they yet live must be always on the brink of ruin." I said, at Ladbroke Hall, in August last, that representative institutions were inconsistent with the very framework of the Turkish rule, and that while they might be inaugurated by decree, it was hopeless to expect that they should really work. The assemblies on which both Turkish and Christian members sit are worse in their character than those which are purely Turkish, for, of all beings upon earth, a Turkish rayah official, cringing to his Turkish colleagues, and more cruel than the Turk to his co-religionists, is about the most degraded. I will say no more then as to the nature of the Turkish rule. It is, by general admission, the worst in Europe, although it is superior to the Persian, the Egyptian, and many non-European Governments. The very descriptions of the comfort of the Roumelian population murdered by the Turks last spring show that the peasantry of Turkey are far less ground down by taxes than is the case with the Persians, or with the Egyptian fellaheen. Sir Fowell Buxton, again, in his speech last month at St. James's Hall, spoke of slavery as existing in European Turkey. It is

possible that in secret it still does, but in a trifling degree if we compare it with the slavery which exists in the territory of sovereigns who within the last few years have been cheered, I am sorry to say, by English crowds, and have received, as enlightened potentates, the freedom of English towns. Of the Sultan Abdul Aziz, Lord Hartington lately said that he was "now admitted by the Turks themselves to have been a voluptuary, sunk in every kind of degradation, and to have contracted all the vices of an Oriental despot." That man also had in this country a reception that a hero might have envied—a reception only once within the last ten years surpassed, and that on the arrival of the Shah of Persia, a despot who, if wanting in the sombre ferocity of the late Sultan, and in the ingenious powers of extortion possessed by the Khedive, was, on the whole, the most barbarous of the three.

Though public meetings now declare that we have always been the backers of the Turks, I must remind you that that is not the case. In 1827, public opinion in England was as violent against the Turks as it has been during the last few months. Our destruction of the Turkish armaments at Navarino created Greece out of the ruin of half the Turkish power; but the very men who created Greece afterwards opposed in Turkey acts which, as they maintained, were the result of Russian ambition. The policy of England in the past has not been a blind support of Turkey, but a resistance to the solution of the Eastern question, by the annexation, either direct or virtual, of the Turkish

European provinces to Russia. Neither the present Government, nor any English Government, could believe that the country would be prepared to go to war without alliances for the mere integrity of the Turkish Empire. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire was injured when Greece was called into existence. It was grievously attacked when England agreed to the virtual independence of the Danubian Principalities. It was terribly shaken when Lord Palmerston freely consented to the hereditary succession in Egypt of the descendants of Mehemet Ali. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire is one of the mumbo-jumbos of diplomacy, and in common with every Liberal who has spoken, and with many Conservatives, I should regard a Government as mad that went to war for that integrity in the abstract. In November, 1870, England, having the alliance of Austria distinctly offered her, refused to stop the French-German war. The country was, on the whole, opposed to the further continuance of the German invasion of France, but it refused to accept the alliance of Austria and to bring the war to an end because it believed that there might have been some faint danger of war for England in her intervention. Some have blamed Mr. Gladstone for the policy that, in 1870, was pursued, as though it had been his personal act ; but although I was strongly opposed to the policy that he followed, I fully admit that he had the country with him. His policy was not challenged by the Conservative party in the House of Commons, and protest against

it was made only by a few independent Liberals below the gangway. If this country is so wedded to peace views that a barely conceivable chance of a war in which we should have had the alliance of France and Austria caused us to shrink from proposing to Prussia fair terms of peace for France, how can any Government believe that the English people would go to war without allies to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire? In November, 1870, we refrained from an intervention on the side of peace; in February, 1871, we intervened only by most timid words for mercy to already punished France, when our own interests, when the European balance, and, as I think, international justice, all concurred to bid us take Austria's advice. Now, France and Austria would be, for certain, neutral, Germany and Italy, as well as Russia, hostile to our intervention, Christian sentiment against us, and our own interest far from clear. If the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was ever a game worth playing, that game is up. Not only the wishes of the English people, but the despatches of the English Government, can be turned against us. What considerations were there that made rebellion legitimate, and the recognition and support of it wise policy in the case of Greece that do not apply to large portions of the present Turkish territory—say, for instance, to the lovely islands of the *Ægean Sea*?

Because we are not ready to fight for the integrity of Turkey, and because even many of us might see with pleasure the downfall of the Turkish power, it by no means follows that we should view without

alarm the destruction of that power in the interests of Russia. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we put out of sight such resisting power as Turkey may still possess, and speculate about the future, there are other settlements of the Eastern question that may commend themselves to us besides that which receives the support of Russia. While we should stand alone in the face of Europe in defending against all comers the integrity of the Turkish Empire, we shall have allies in the present and friends in the future if we meet the proposal of one solution by the proposal of another. In opposing a Russian conquest of Constantinople we certainly should not stand alone; it would be resisted in arms by Europe, and with this amount of justice, that even the preachers of Slavonic unity can show no cause why the Slavonic rather than the Hellenic race should, in the event of Turkish disruption, receive that city. If we look to nationality the Greeks would be the reversionary heirs of the Turks at Constantinople.

Besides the Greek solution there are Slavonic solutions of different kinds. The Moscow dream may be that of a Russian Empire including all the Slavs, who, by the way, form the greater proportion of the population of the Austrian Empire, of whom there are millions in Prussia, and some even in Italy, near Venice. But the Servian dream is different. Servia prays for the revival of the Empire of Stephen Douchan, "Tsar of the Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians." There is, in the correspondence of the First Napoleon, a letter in which the Emperor declares

that he cannot allow the consolidation of the Russian influence in Servia; and there can be no doubt that the ultimate divergence of the interests of the Russians and the Southern Slavs has been foreseen from the beginning of the century. Napoleon, at the moment of the sharpest temptation to consent to anything that would secure to him the Russian alliance, and with all his intense hatred of England, and desire to see her rule in India crushed, supported the traditional policy of France in refusing to give Constantinople to Russia, although his consent would, perhaps, have preserved his dynasty. The extension of the Russian railway system in the last few years, by making the enormous numbers of the Russians, for the first time, comparatively effective, and the weakening of Western Europe through the temporary fall of France, have made Slavonic unity under Russian autocracy a still greater danger to Europe than it has been in the past. The world cannot afford to see a hundred and twenty millions of Slavs united under the sceptre of an absolute despot, holding at Constantinople the strongest position in all Europe, stretching from the Adriatic to Kamskatchka and Behring's Straits, and holding in the Corea the strongest position in the Pacific. I was present in 1867 at the delivery of the famous speech in which M. Rouher said, "*L'Italie n'aura jamais Rome*," and in 1870 she had it. But if ever it be allowable to prophesy what nations will do from what they should do, I think that we might with safety declare that Russia will never have Constantinople.

Violent attacks have lately been made by some speakers upon those who have expressed their doubts as to the trustworthiness and moderation of Russia, and they have been classed as Russophobes. Now I am not a Russophobe. A Russophobe is a man who is afraid of Russia. I am not afraid of Russia, but that is no reason why I should admire or support her policy. I think that those who, like one of the speakers at the December meeting, attempt to terrify the people of this country with pictures of the might of Russia are altogether in the wrong. It is now ten years since, after a visit to the Punjab, I wrote that which, after five journeys in Russia, I can repeat: that we could raise Central Asia against Russia far more easily than Russia could raise India against us. I am not one of those who detract from the native force of the Russian race. I have the highest respect for those writers who, at Prague and Moscow, have revived the Slavonic spirit. The attempts of the sons of the rich but ignorant Moscow peasant merchants to form in Russia a cultivated middle class have no greater admirer than myself. I love the Russian peasants, as do all who know them; and it must be remembered that in Russia the peasants form an overwhelming majority of the population. Among her nobles, although perhaps the greater number are not thoroughly worthy of the position which they hold, Russia has soldiers and travellers of whom any country might be proud. The fact that the savage Slavs of Montenegro slit the noses of their prisoners, that most of the Slavs are barbarous in their religion, and that

the Slavonic countries persecute the Jews, is no reason for denying that as a whole they are a race from whom much may be expected in the future. The ferocity of the Montenegrins and the cowardice of the Servian militia should not prejudice us against the whole family to which they belong. The characteristics of a race often vary very much in the different parts of the countries which they occupy, and depend upon the conditions to which, for centuries at a time, they have been submitted. The polished and brave Magyar of Hungary is not more different from the boorish and servile Tcheremiss of the Siberian frontier, both being members of the Ugrian race, than the docile Russian husbandman from the fierce Montenegrin bully. But an immense sympathy with Young Russia, so far from modifying, would rather tend to increase one's distrust of the policy of the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg—an office which speaks German, and the policy of which for ten years past has been that of two very able Germans, MM. Westmann and Hamburger, and is now the policy of an extraordinarily able Swiss, Baron Jomini. No member of a Slavonic Committee can believe more firmly than I do in the future which lies before the Russian people; but that is not a reason why I should give my sympathy to the autocracy that commands and the bureaucracy which preys upon the Russia of the present day.

What is this Russian power with which the Liberals of England are to strike alliance? It is the power which has been through history the most consistent upholder of absolutism in Europe. It is

the only European power which has to this day no representative system, and which continues to be an absolute autocracy of the purest type. It is the power which crushes Poland; the power which crushed Hungary for Austria. It is the only power which is rapidly and continually annexing the territories of its neighbours; and it is a power which is reputed false to treaty obligations. A very able Liberal journal, in an article, with most of which I cordially agree, lately used these words:—"The attitude of the Liberal party towards Russia has changed because Russia is no longer the criminal whose acts merit condemnation. They have not changed their opinion of what she did in 1863 and 1864, but that is past help. If Russia should again oppress the Poles, it will be the duty of English Liberals to condemn Russia as frankly as they did twelve years ago." Why, if Russia has been in twelve years, and without a change either of Emperor or of Ministers, converted from a demon of wickedness into an angel of light, there may be hope for the Turks themselves. These deeds of twelve years ago were committed during the reign of, and with the approval of, and were munificently rewarded by, the present autocrat, of whose personal dispositions we now hear great praise, and who is the chief factor in the production of that Russia of to-day which is contrasted by the *Daily News* with the Russia of 1864. The present Emperor is called "The Liberator of the Serfs," and "the enlightened ruler of an enfranchised people." Those who know Russia well are aware that the Emperor is less

liberal now then he was in 1861. The like has been seen before with Russian Emperors. The very same phrases which are applied to Alexander II. appear in the biographies of Alexander I. It was said that by a ukase of February, 1803, Alexander the First had freed his people, and he, too, was described, not only by Russian, but also by French historians, as "The Liberator of Russia," and "the most enlightened of European monarchs," although in his later years he was guilty of tyranny and oppression. The present Emperor's title to the respect of Liberals is founded upon a measure of 1861, which was a necessary first step to liberty, and which, had it been followed by those modifications of the internal passport system which its authors intended, would have set the Russians on the high-road to individual freedom. But the Emperor got frightened at what had been done in his name; the measures which were to have followed did not follow; and so far from its being true that the Russia of 1876 is more free than the Russia of 1862, I venture to assert that the contrary is the case. The Emperor Alexander is a well-meaning man; he began his reign with a belief that he had a divine mission upon earth. That belief has disappeared under the dread of assassination, and he is too terrified to complete the reforms which in 1861 were promised in his name. He is a kind father, brother, and husband, and in all his personal relations a mild and element man, but he deliberately sent Mouravieff to Wilna to do work the nature of which was so well known beforehand that

other officers had respectfully declined the post. Some of my statements may be denied ; the Russian autocracy has in England many powerful friends, and letters may be written to the papers in which the opposite view to mine is taken, while not much distinct evidence can be produced on either side. I offer, then, these views to you as being carefully formed after much observation, and certainly not biassed by any pre-existing prejudice, and I pass to those public and notorious facts which lead me to question that opinion of the Russian Government which is put forward in the article which I have just now quoted. The article, you will remember, said that Russia had acted criminally towards Poland as late as 1864, but that she had wholly ceased to oppress Poland now. The article made no reference to the horrible cruelties committed by the Russians in the Caucasus a little before the date of those in Poland, and also during the reign of the present Emperor. It made no reference to the rewards bestowed by the present Emperor within the last two years upon the authors of orders given in Turkestan for the destruction of women and children by the sword. But let us neglect these, follow the article, and begin with Poland. The article speaks of the criminality of acts committed in 1863 and 1864 under the instructions of the present autocrat, who had already won those praises for his clemency which are founded upon the reform of 1861. What was thought of those acts in England at the time? Lord Russell, although invested, as Foreign Minister, with a position which disposed him to caution in his words

spoke at Blairgowrie, in September, 1863, of the horror with which England viewed the acts of Russia. They were not then at their worst. The highest point of cruelty was reached under Mouravieff's rule at Wilna, early in 1864, in the silence of the winter snows, and when the ice which sealed the Baltic had shut out Russia from our reach. Even in September, 1863, Lord Russell had said that the Tsar had violated the conditions upon which the allies had made his predecessor sovereign of Poland. It is true that England did not officially make to Russia so strong a representation as is contained in Lord Russell's words, but why was that? The cabinet, of which, by the way, Mr. Gladstone was a leading member, wrote a despatch that was even stronger than Lord Russell's speech. The Government and the Queen approved words in which the Tsar was told that he had forfeited the sovereignty of Poland. That despatch was not presented. Why? Because we had learnt through the present Prince von Bismarck that Prussia would probably make common cause with Russia, and treat its presentation as a *casus belli*. Through the partition of Poland the interests of Prussia are so bound up with those of Russia that in 1864 she sealed her frontier to the despairing flight of the few insurgents that might otherwise have escaped the Russian gallows. Even in these days Prussia, by her position, forms the real obstacle to Polish liberty; and as in 1863 she was called the "Jackal of Russia," so now it must be said that she is of necessity her confederate. A milder despatch was sent, but England and France

and even Austria showed very clearly their disapproval of Russia's course. "Warned by the remonstrances of Europe, Russia nevertheless persevered in the violation of her engagements." Such are Lord Russell's later words. In the House of Lords, although still Foreign Secretary, he said, "Nothing can justify the violation of law and humanity of which the Emperor Alexander has been guilty."

The Russians, who now, in the present case, with perfect justness, blame the Turks for not carrying out their promises to Europe, have absolutely violated their own promises to Europe concerning Poland. I speak not only of the period which has succeeded 1861; the violation of Russian promises had begun from the very time at which those promises were made. After the defeat of the Poles in 1831, in an insurrection which had been caused by gross misgovernment, fresh promises were made by Russia to the Poles and Europe. But in March, 1861, General Tymowski, reporting confidentially to the present Emperor, said, "The decree of 1831 has never yet seen even a commencement of execution." In the debate in the English House of Commons, Lord Palmerston admitted that Russia had violated both public and moral law. He spoke of "the cruel injuries inflicted on Poland by the agents of the Russian Government." He said that the outbreak of 1863 had sprung out of a distinct violation by the Russian Government of their own law, made with the avowed object of forcing into the ranks of the Russian army for Asian service every man in

Poland possessed of public spirit. He "concurred," he said, "in the censure and condemnation passed on the conduct of Russia." "No one had excused, palliated, or justified that conduct." He went even further, and allowed that he was "very much disposed to agree in the opinion that Russia had forfeited her rights over Poland under the treaty of Vienna," which was, you will remember, the same statement as that made in the unrepresented despatch. Lord Russell, at about the same time, speaking of the origin of the Polish rising, said, "The violence of the Viceroy it was that drove the Poles in anger and despair into insurrection." At the time when this language was being held in Parliament, public meetings throughout the length and breadth of England were denouncing the cruelties that were being committed in Poland, and those deeds in Lithuania which won for Mouravieff his name of infamy. Had that woman-flogging General visited this country at that time, he would have met with the same treatment at English hands as did Haynau fourteen years before.

Many of those whose sympathies are always with the oppressed, whatever may be their race and whoever their oppressors, spoke out within the walls of Parliament. Even as early as May 8, 1863, Lord Shaftesbury made a very violent, but perfectly justified, attack upon the Emperor Alexander. He spoke of the "outrage, deceit, and oppression" which were being committed in Poland with his knowledge. He described the Russian Power under a figure, in which he spoke of "the growth

of the baleful upas tree which spreads desolation around it on every side, and is as fatal to all who come within the circuit of its pestilential influence." After giving much evidence as to the nature of the crimes that had been committed, Lord Shaftesbury used these words: "Of all the outrages ever perpetrated by sinful man, there is not one more foul and horrible." He spoke of "devilish and Satanic deeds." On June 22, 1863 (although, as you remember, the worst cruelties were yet to come), Lord Palmerston described the acts of Russia as "proceedings which make humanity shudder..... atrocities which are a disgrace to human nature." On July 24th, in the same year, Lord Clanricarde, speaking in the House of Lords, declared that by Mouravieff's orders priests had been shot for giving the sacrament to insurgents dying of their wounds, and "women wearing mourning in the streets, no matter what bereavement they might have undergone, were to be treated like women of the town, registered, and subjected to all the examinations to which that class were liable." General Mouravieff was not hanged, as we hope that Achmet Agha may be; he was decorated, promoted, and up to the moment of his death was one of the most trusted servants and councillors of the Emperor Alexander. To satisfy public opinion our Government, in concert with that of France, demanded that Russia should grant an amnesty, liberty of conscience, representative government in Poland, the use of the Polish language, and should cease from the arbitrary conscription for the army of the whole of the Polish youth, and

retain only for Poland a conscription similar to that which exists in Russia. Proposals far more mild than those which Russia is forcing upon Turkey now were rejected by Russia in terms of violence. Russia rejected the French proposal for a conference: she rejected the whole of the suggestions of the English Liberals. She has withheld from Poland that representative government that she was pledged to grant. She has forbidden the use of the Polish language. She has enormously increased her violations of liberty of conscience; and as for amnesty, when the insurrection of despair had been finally put down in Poland, there occurred, instead of amnesty, in the first place executions without number, and then transportations so general and so long continued, that as late as the summer of 1869 I met upon the road between Ekatarinburg and Perm long processions of Polish exiles, who by hundreds were still being sent into the solitudes of Siberia. The article which I quoted said that the criminal acts committed in 1863 and 1864 by the Emperor Alexander's orders had now ceased, and that Poland was not now oppressed. Is there in Poland that representative government which, in 1814, 1815, and 1831, Russia promised to maintain? Is the Polish language recognized? Is there that "full and entire liberty of conscience, without restrictions placed on worship," for which England asked? I am speaking, I assure you, of what I myself have seen, when I tell you that as late as 1870 I visited the churches of Witebsk, just after they had been torn by force from the creed of the

people and made over to the orthodox church, which had no followers but soldiers and placemen in the town. According to the correspondent of the *New Free Press* of Vienna, as late as the 18th August, 1876, the inhabitants of a Lithuanian village were imprisoned because, being members of the Uniat church, they refused to accept an Imperial decree by which the Uniat has been made a branch of the orthodox church. As for amnesty, I am assured by those whose word I can trust that in 1876 there might still be seen that which I saw in 1869—processions of Polish exiles torn from their homes in times, not of revolution, but of profound peace. What of the measures in Poland for the settlement of the country that followed the acts of 1864? They were less terrible than those of Mouravieff and the other governors-general, but they were not less ruthless in their disregard of all those principles which Liberals hold dear. I know the men who were selected by the Tsar from among the Moscow Slavophiles to carry out the new land settlement of Poland. Their names were suggested in December last by the Russian semi-official press for service at the head of the government in Bulgaria. They are acute and patriotic men, they are the pride of Moscow. They are not only able, but well intentioned, but they are not men with whose views Liberals can sympathize, but, on the contrary, men prepared, as they showed in Poland ten years ago, to support by the most reckless acts the only great autocracy in Europe. So much for the Polish episode of the Emperor Alexander's reign, and for

the statement that Poland is not misgoverned now. Does the Polish episode stand alone?

Lord Russell, who is one of the most violent opponents of the Turks, and who, therefore, if he were like some confiding Liberals, might excuse himself for supporting Russia at the present time, said, in a letter published in the *Times* in October last, "The Emperor of Russia does not love civil or religious liberty." That is the rough way in which an old Liberal puts the matter. We hear nothing from Lord Russell about an "enlightened sovereign," the "emancipator of his people"; we hear only, and, as I think, with truth, that the Emperor Alexander does not love civil and religious liberty. His view of religious liberty has been shown not only by his treatment of the popular church in Poland, but by his refusal to complete the emancipation of the Jews. The Emperor Alexander's hatred of civil liberty may be gathered from his treatment of the Baltic provinces and of Poland, and may be further illustrated by many passages of his reign. In November, 1870, for instance, Russia had denounced some of the arrangements come to in 1856, with a flagrant disregard of her treaty obligations, which I attempted to expose in the House of Commons in 1871. Addresses to the Emperor were sent up from all parts of Russia, and all but one were favourably received, for they contained only the commonplaces which had been officially suggested to their authors. The last paragraph, however, of the Moscow address consisted of a few very moderate and almost timid words, in which those who signed it humbly

expressed their hope that the Tsar would signalize his reign by the concession of what they called "further" liberties at home. These further liberties were not detailed, but it was understood that some measure of constitutional or representative government, however small, was meant. The Emperor was furious at the insertion of these words, and refused to accept the address. The Empress returned from the Crimea to St. Petersburg by a circuitous route, in order to mark the Court displeasure by avoiding Moscow, and the Emperor himself did not pay his accustomed visit to the town. Exactly the same thing has, I believe, occurred with regard to the Warsaw address of November, 1876. I think that I have produced some evidence in support of Lord Russell's view that the Emperor Alexander does not love civil or religious liberty.

There has lately been a discussion in the English papers founded upon the books of my friends Messrs. Schuyler and McGahan as to a massacre of women and children committed in 1873 by the Russian troops in Turkestan. Mr. Gladstone has hinted that Mr. Schuyler has a personal antipathy to General Kauffmann. I believe that I am justified in saying that Mr. Schuyler is not acquainted with the Russian governor of Turkestan, and that his bad opinion of him is founded upon his misgovernment. I am no more going into a discussion of the statements that have been made than into a detailed account of the acts in Poland to which I have before referred; but it is a singular fact that the only

point that renders the controversy of any real importance has been overlooked. There is great doubt as to whether the massacre ordered by the Russian General was carried out by his men ; but no denial whatever has been put forward of the fact that General Kauffmann broke faith with the Turkoman in his invasion of their territory, and no denial of the fact that the order to massacre women and children was given by the generals to the troops. I have not heard that General Golovatchef has been dismissed—I think it more likely that he has been decorated ; and General Kauffmann, loaded with favours by the Emperor Alexander, still rules in Turkestan.

When certain assurances were lately given to the English Ambassador by the Emperor Alexander, there were some who recalled the fact that with regard to the occupation of Khiva promises had been made by him which had not been kept. The case of Khiva does not stand alone. In the case of Samarcand, a personal promise was made to the English Ambassador by the present Tsar that the occupation should be only temporary. Samarcand has since that time been annexed to the Russian Empire. It is interesting to compare the Emperor Alexander's personal assurances of his love for peace and of his disinterestedness with those which were given by the Emperor Nicholas when he attacked Turkey in 1853-4. The Emperor Nicholas said, " Russia is not fighting for her interests, but for her faith. She will never allow herself to be diverted from her divine mission. May Almighty

God help us to prove this by our deeds." Now none of us believe that the Emperor Nicholas had no thought of Russian interests in his attack upon the Turkish Empire, because we are acquainted with the proposals which he had made to Sir Hamilton Seymour before the war. In spite of repeated protests from the Emperor Nicholas of a similar character to those which have been lately made by the Emperor Alexander, a cabinet, of which Mr. Gladstone was a member, read, weighed, and refused to accept those words, and pronounced them deceitful words, intended to cloak designs of plunder. My own view is that the Emperor Alexander is quite aware that Constantinople is not within the reach of Russia at the present time; but no one who has watched continental politics with care can fail to believe that Russia has long had the conquest of Constantinople well in view. In 1811 she intrigued for it with France, abandoning England, who had fought steadily as her ally. In 1830 she intrigued for it with France, Prussia, and Austria, offering to France the Rhine frontier, and to Prussia and Austria other compensations; and some historians have gone so far as to maintain that it was only the fall of Charles X., in 1830, that barred her from success. The annexation of Constantinople by Russia, although it would increase our naval estimates by a couple of millions or so a year, would, however, be on the whole, perhaps, less of a blow to England than would another annexation far more likely to be seriously attempted in our time. I mean the annexation of Turkish Armenia

and of the southern coast of the Black Sea, which, bearing in mind Russian Protectionism, would materially harm our Levantine trade, and directly threaten our interests on the Persian Gulf.

Looking, then, to all the facts, I think that we are justified, not, indeed, in fear of Russia, but in a certain measure of suspicion. So far as Liberals are concerned, an absence of cordial sympathy with such a Government seems natural. The *Spectator* has been the most strongly anti-Turkish of our leading journals, yet the *Spectator* of November 4th confirms my view upon this point. It speaks of the Russian Government as being "leavened with barbarism." "The Court, judged by its record throughout history, is undoubtedly tainted with faithlessness; the Executive, military and civil, is very careless to human suffering.....For ourselves, we believe that Russian faithlessness in promises and Russian callousness when provoked, and Russian ambition, are sound reasons for watching Russia — for keeping ourselves prepared, and for acting, should it become necessary, with energy and fearlessness." I repeat, then, that when asked to support Russia the Liberal party is asked to support a power which, since it was first admitted to the European family, has been the permanent and the principal opponent of Liberal ideas. That power at the end of the last century committed acts precisely similar to those in Bulgaria which have lately made infamous the name of the Turks. In the present day, and under the government of the so-called Liberal Emperor who now rules the country, education is

stationary, if it has not actually gone back, protectionism in trade is rampant, and from Central Asia foreign goods and foreign travellers are almost absolutely excluded. From the whole Russian Empire all foreign books are excluded except those which are permitted by the Holy Synod. The enlightened Government which is to be the future friend of English Liberals stops all printed matter at its frontier. No one under the rank of general can receive a newspaper from abroad by post. If you post newspapers to friends living in many countries that are looked upon as barbarous, they will reach them with certainty; but if you post a newspaper to a friend in Russia the law forbids that it should ever reach him; and if you ever pack some present in old newspapers to send it him with care, it will reach him broken to pieces, from the newspapers having been pulled out at the frontier by the police. Official Russia is eaten up by a gangrene of venality and corruption. Turkey having adopted a constitution, Russia and Monaco are the only two remaining autocracies in Europe. In Russia every man still lives at the mercy of the secret Imperial police. This is the country which is to be the Liberal's friend.

THE END.

ALSO, BY THE SAME AUTHOR,

GREATER BRITAIN:

A RECORD OF TRAVEL IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING LANDS.

Seventh Edition.

MACMILLAN & CO.

SATURDAY REVIEW.—“Sir Charles Dilke has written a book that is probably as well worth reading as any book of the same aims that ever was written.....Sir Charles Dilke's central idea is one likely to be of immense use.Written in a lively and agreeable style; implies a great deal of physical pluck; no page of it fails to show an acute and highly intelligent observer; stimulates the imagination as well as the judgment of the reader; and is on, perhaps, the most interesting subject that can attract an Englishman who cares about his country.”

M. THIERS.—“Sir Charles Dilke, a member of the English Parliament, one of the most enlightened men of his country, who, after having traversed all English-speaking countries, has written a book of extraordinary merit.”

SIR GEORGE BOWEN, Governor of New Zealand: Despatch to Earl Granville.—“I beg leave to mention that I have just received and read a copy of ‘Greater Britain,’ the work recently published by Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke. The chapters on New Zealand are admirably graphic, and the description of the Maories and of the difficulties of New Zealand warfare are true to the life.”

THE EDINBURGH REVIEW.—“Sir Charles Dilke is the first who conceived the happy idea of extending his voyages over the whole area, and bounding them by the area, of English-speaking countries.....‘Greater Britain’ contains much interesting matter, abounds with acute reflections, and suggests food for meditation on points which affect the progress of our numerous dependencies and the future fortunes of our raceThere are many topics of interest in Sir Charles Dilke's volumes to which we have not adverted, but which he has discussed in such a manner as always to provoke attention, if not to command assent. We differ from him in several conclusions, but we have been less anxious to indicate the points of our disagreement than of our concurrence, and we are happy to welcome the appearance of a work which, if it contains some questionable propositions, is pervaded throughout not less by a kindly feeling towards inferior races than by a quick and thoughtful observation of the most remarkable features in the public and private life of transpontine England, and is worthy of commendation as illustrating the spirit of intelligent adventure and liberal speculation which ought to animate the young legislators of our isles.”

THE TIMES.—"Even as a mere work of travel, 'Greater Britain' is exceedingly pleasant reading, and it gives one, in a comparatively small compass, an infinity of information of the sort one most cares to have. Above all, it is eminently suggestive, and what we should pronounce its highest merit is not so much the knowledge it communicates as the craving it excites for more."

REVUE DES DEUX MONDES.—"On ne tardera pas à reconnaître que l'auteur de ce livre intéressant a bien des choses à nous apprendre. Il parle en observateur qui a étudié avec le plus grand soin les sujets dont il s'occupe. On peut ne pas admettre ses conclusions ; il serait injuste, d'un autre côté, de ne pas rendre hommage à son talent."

THE MORNING POST.—"Had these volumes appeared six months since, it would have been our duty to notice them as the production of a new claimant on general attention, but during his recent candidature in the borough of Chelsea the author, by numerous public speeches, remarkable for decision, thoughtfulness, and courageous purpose, has rendered himself so conspicuous amongst rising politicians, that, unlike most first books of untried writers, instead of being a card and letter of introduction left by a young aspirant at the guild of literature, 'Greater Britain' is a declaration of opinion from an actor whose character is familiar to the world, and whose doings have demonstrated his ability to influence the course of his generation. That the book justifies the high esteem in which he is held by his political supporters is the least that can be said of an achievement which is at the same time a contribution to the literature of travel, the literature of philosophic history, and the literature of political science.....All that we can do is to commend it to the notice of all readers who delight in entertaining records of adventure, and all earnest students of political science and social history."

THE DAILY NEWS.—"A work full of suggestiveness and power, pleasant to read as a record of travel, but possessing larger claims upon our attention than any mere traveller's story.....Admirably written volumes."

THE TELEGRAPH.—"A more agreeable author it would be difficult to imagine.....The most communicative, gossiping, yet sensible of guides. Full of anecdote, always lively, yet never gushing ;.....never by any chance vulgar.A most entertaining and almost fascinating book of travel. Everybody should read it, and at once."

THE PALL MALL GAZETTE.—"On the whole, we commend Sir Charles Dilke's book heartily, as one that shows great soundness of mind and feeling, and one from which its readers will derive such broad ideas of politics as are seldom met with in books of travel."

THE GLOBE.—"A keen observer, and a practised writer."

THE ECHO.—"Honest and manly."

THE SPECTATOR.—"Sir Charles Dilke's volumes have the advantage of a manly style and of a distinct aim. He describes, with picturesque felicity, and often with considerable humour, the objects that he sees, and at the same time discusses, with great ability, a number of subjects, political, social, religious, which are likely to affect the future destiny of the English family. The book is therefore eminently suggestive. It is as full of thoughts as of facts, and if the views expressed in it are sometimes extreme, it will be found that from the author's standing-point they are reasonable enough. We are unable to accompany Sir Charles Dilke as he follows England round the world. Vigour of thought and shrewdness of observation are obvious throughout. He has the rare art of describing what he sees in brief incisive words ; he can tell a story admirably ; he has accumulated a large store of facts, and applies them with

singular felicity ; he has strong opinions, and expresses them with energy and clearness.....All readers will feel that they are in presence of a writer whose distinct purpose, breadth of culture, and liberality of thought, entitle him to attention and command respect."

FRASER'S MAGAZINE.—"Sir Charles Dilke's work is both an original and a striking one. Treating of a wide subject, it is not diffuse. Passing over many lands, it leaves a clear and distinctive impression of each on the reader. As a photograph of the ideas and hopes fermenting in the minds of our race in its Transatlantic homes it is very valuable. As a vivid sketch, in brief words, of the characteristic scenery of the various British inhabited or ruled countries it is excellent.....There is one great charm about this book—it is eminently a suggestive one. It is impossible to read twenty pages of it without feeling inclined to lay it down and think over what you have read, and this is not what can be said of many works nowadays."

LLOYD'S NEWS.—"We trust that 'Greater Britain' will find its way into every village library. It will give a glow to the humblest of Englishmen."

THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS.—"Very clever and interesting.....full of charms of style.....Sir Charles Dilke speaks in the tone of a scholar, man of business, and man of the world, thoroughly conversant with the history of his own age, who feels a generous zeal for the enduring welfare of his race."

THE MANCHESTER EXAMINER.—"Rarely has a more interesting book issued from the press. It is as charming as a fairy tale, and overflowing with instruction."

THE BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW.—"Very able and interesting."

THE LITERARY CHURCHMAN.—"Pleasant reading for any one."

THE WATCHMAN AND WESLEYAN ADVERTISER.—"Will interest and profit."

THE FREEMAN.—"We have given Sir Charles Dilke's volumes as much space as we can afford, and yet have expressed very inadequately the interest with which we have read them."

THE NONCONFORMIST.—"A book which all who are proud of the English name should read for themselves.....Variety and life, calm and philosophic spirit, breadth, liberality, and boldness of views.....The idea and title of the book of themselves indicate genius.....Refined taste, high culture, intellectual vigour."

THE CHRISTIAN WORLD.—"The book is one to be carefully studied. It will instruct the mind, and, what is of more importance, it will enlarge the sympathies of its readers.....The very title of Sir Charles Dilke's book is a stroke of genius, and at once indicates the breadth of view, the superiority to mere local feeling, and the political wisdom by which this charming record of travel is distinguished."

THE LITERARY WORLD.—"Clear, lucid, and attractive style."

THE RECORD.—"Intensely clever, and exceedingly attractive."

THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.—"A really valuable contribution to our knowledge of the work which the Anglo-Saxon race is doing."

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.—"Regarded as a narrative of travel, this is, in our opinion, the best which our age—prolific in such literature—has produced. It possesses every quality, every charm, requisite for rendering such a book perfect according to a critical standard of taste. It is precise and intelligible, *suivi* and categorical, as though intended to serve as a handbook ; it is picturesque, brilliant, graphic, and absorbingly interesting, as the most eager amateur of the essay or the novel could desire. No reader, with the most moderate distaste to the 'heavy' in literature, could advance such a plea against this book, and

however he loves 'light' reading, he must be so instructed by it, if even against his will, as to acknowledge the genius of the writer. Rapid and strange as the errant fancies of a fairy tale, vigorous and incisive in style to a degree so seldom found in books of travel that Mr. Dilke is likely to spoil his readers' taste for that class of literature for some time to come, the book is so entirely novel, so completely a thing of art, that first it creates intense surprise. Here is a writer with an absolutely new style. What is the trick of it? That there is no trick at all; that the book is written as the first book ever composed in this world may have been written, not 'after' anybody, not to confute, or refute, or rival anybody, but out of the fulness of a highly-organized, richly-cultivated, powerful, but most philosophical intellect, untainted by egotism, undisfigured by any kind of affectation, adding to the eager intelligence of a keen observer the teachableness of the sincere and genuine learner. The quite unconscious modesty with which the writer relates such facts of travel as have rarely been accomplished, but, when accomplished, have been 'taken out in bragging' until the public became more irritated than edified by their recital, is one of the chief charms of this book, of which we think we do not err in predicting—as did Pope of Garrick—that it has never had an equal, and will never have a rival. The expansiveness and importance of the author's design, and the courage, consistency, and steady application of every faculty with which he carried it out, are deducible from his pages, but not announced by his professions. The most philosophical traveller in the Western World who has yet painted its strange pictures for us, he does not parade his philosophical intent, or mount any kind of platform. The pleasure of reading this book is increased by thinking of the appropriate, elevating, mind-enlarging training by which its author has qualified himself for public life.

"To the reader who knows much of the countries of which he tells, and to the readers who know little, this narrative will be alike, if not equally, delightful. It appeals to the former by the novel point of view, by the freshness, the vivacity, the humour, and the strong, practical conclusiveness with which it handles topics of large importance to the future destinies—of deep significance in the present history—of mankind. It appeals to the latter by its wonderful mass of information, by its far-reaching scope, by its successive revelations of the world, and of them who dwell therein, so classified that, immense as is their extent, they are readily grasped and retained by the intelligence, and as luminous as a chain of diamonds. In the light of this brilliant mind and manner, the most familiar topic of the traveller is invested with a warm glow of life and suggestion which makes it far more interesting than it has ever before been.

"The 'thorough' nature of Mr. Dilke's investigations is no less remarkable than the width of their field. 'The cedar of Lebanon, and the hyssop springing out of the wall,' is a simile which may be applied to the range and the detail of his knowledge. From the awful problems of the development and the destiny of the men of those far lands which he has studied, to the varieties and the properties of the blossoms which carpet the prairies and the minerals which lurk in the recesses of the earth; from the grandest physical features of the boundless continent to the distinguishing traits of the least important of the tribes which tenant its wastes—this wide-reaching, well-balanced, quite impartial mind applies itself. That comparison of Nasmyth's hammer, and the extremes of work which it does, is a hackneyed one, but it is of strict application here. Strong human sympathies, wide toleration, and an attachment to his own nationality, candid and proud, but which never tempts him into prejudice, into depreciating foreign merit, or justifying English national iniquity, are chief among the chief moral characteristics of the author, manifested in his work. The result is, that he inspires as much confidence as admiration, and that, however extraordinary any of his statements may appear, his readers have no suspicion that they are exaggerated. There is no stage effect in his representation of the eccentricities and extravagancies of the still somewhat

chaotic social systems of the New World. He studies and reveals Mormonism without mountebank enthusiasm, and treats of the creeds of Brahma and Buddha without any of the familiar scorn whose point is supplied by complacent ignorance. The plan of this great feat of travel was simple. In his own simple words it is told.....The execution of the scheme involved such exertion of body and mind as few travellers have undergone. The contrast between this book and ordinary narratives of travel, in which the authors appear, in general, to give their minds as little to do as possible, makes that evident. How steadily, how unflaggingly, Mr. Dilke pursued this great purpose of his; the thorough study of the condition of men, in its every aspect, in every country wherein the Anglo-Saxon has set his foot, the reader watches with ever-increasing delight, as he follows him from Virginia to New York, New Hampshire, and the lakes of Maine; to Niagara, of which he gives, in a few lines, the best description within our knowledge; to Ohio, in his account of which State there occurs a passage which might be recorded as a type of the concise and the comprehensive style.....The poetic power of the author's description of the great plains is very remarkable. He ushers in his narrative of that wonderful journey thus.....The letter from Denver is one of the finest chapters in the book; the chapter called 'Red India' is a brilliant and exhaustive essay; 'Colonists' is an amazing picture of the presence and the potentiality of Nature's wealth. And then come a series of inimitable social sketches—'Brigham Young,' 'Western Editors,' 'Utah,' and others; and then the writer takes us to El Dorado, and shows us the beauty and the wealth of California as we have never been shown them before. Then, from the Golden City, and from Little China, to Mexico, and then we have some more profound and charming social essays, and the author carries us off to Polynesia. We cannot follow the course of this wonderful journey, which embraced all the colonies, and looked long at Ceylon, and whose details never flag in intense and varied interest. We are forced to take an abrupt leave of this book, after an insufficient glance at it; but we do so feeling that no one book within the compass of our reading of books contributes so much to the ingredients indispensable to a modern collection, in that practical sense of understanding the tides and currents of the great ocean of humanity, as 'Greater Britain.'

THE FALL OF PRINCE FLORESTAN OF MONACO.

BY HIMSELF.

(Now acknowledged to be by Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke.)

CHEAP EDITION.

MACMILLAN & CO.

STANDARD.—"In an age little remarkable for powers of political satire the sparkle of the pages gives them every claim to welcome."

HOOR.—"Here there may at least be something for the Radical party in England, and the National Education League, for Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain to learn, to say nothing of the senior member for Chelsea."

GLOBE.—“The moral of the story is obvious, and we need hardly say that under the banter and fun there is a good deal of sound sense.”

PALL MALL GAZETTE.—“The book, however, is not likely to pass soon from the notice of the English, nor for that matter of the Continental, public, for we understand that the Prince is already having it translated for republication abroad. Those who have read only the extracts given above will not need to be told how amusing and happily touched it is. Those who read it for other purposes than amusement can hardly miss the sober and sound political lessons with which its light pages abound, and which are as much needed in England as by the nation to whom the author directly addresses his moral.”

PALL MALL GAZETTE, a second Article headed “Lessons from the Fall of Prince Florestan of Monaco.”—“It is probably the highest success to be hoped for by a satirist that each of his readers should feel how keenly the satire strikes somebody else. Such a success is, in fact, a testimony to the breadth of his aim, and to the reach of his ridicule. It shows that he has exposed not the mere follies of a clique, but the weaknesses of a society, and weaknesses so deep-rooted that they have become unconscious, and no one notices their presence except in his neighbours. To a success of this kind the witty little apologue which we noticed lately can undoubtedly lay claim. Hundreds of those who have been laughing over the misadventures of Prince Florestan have doubtless congratulated themselves that they are not as that young doctrinaire.”

ACADEMY.—“A pleasant *jeu d'esprit*.”

Paris Correspondent of THE ACADEMY.—“The translation of ‘Prince Florestan of Monaco’ is beginning to excite commentators and critics..... ‘Prince Florestan’ has been compared with ‘Rabagas’ and Legouvé’s satires, and the English pamphlet is allowed to bear the comparison well, without paling or dwindling.”

SPECTATOR.—“Evidently written by a political and literary disciple of Mr. Matthew Arnold’s: a political disciple, because it preaches the same general doctrine that English politics are apt to be ignorant and pretentious, and to offer as cures for the ills of the whole world what are at best but very rude empirical remedies for the diseases of one small class of tough constitutions; a literary disciple, because his English composition is of the same pure natural kind, and his incidental criticisms of events and persons have a similar turn of irony.”

EXAMINER.—“There is much amusement and not a little political wisdom in this narrative of the fall of a Republican Prince.”

VANITY FAIR.—“I have been favoured with a copy of ‘Prince Florestan of Monaco.’ For humour, which is at once delicate and hearty, and yet which always has a serious meaning, there is no living writer to be compared to Matthew Arnold.”

(N.B.—The work is not from the pen of Mr. Matthew Arnold.)

